# 1AC – Zionism

## Part 1: Framework

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the simulated consequences of the affirmative policy vs a competing neg policy option to reduce material oppression.

#### 1. The aff deploys the state to learn scenario planning- even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19,

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### 2. Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemically skewed

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,

“The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that **all theorizing**, both moral and nonmoral, **takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by** concepts, assumptions, norms, **values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience** and group interests **of the privileged group** (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that **dominant concepts will obscure** certain **crucial realities**, blocking them from sight, or **naturalizing them**, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. **In** its **ignoring** of **oppression, ideal theory** also **ignores the consequences of oppression.** If societies are not oppressive, or **if in modeling them we can abstract** away from oppression **and assume moral cognizers of** roughly **equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group.** By contrast, **nonideal theory recognizes that people will** typically **be cognitively affected by their social location, so that** on both the macro and the more local level, **the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.**” (175)

#### 3. No act omission distinction for states means means based theories collapse to consequentialism.

Sunstein and Vermule 05[Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. The University of Chicago Law School. “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs.” JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 239. The Chicago Working Paper Series. March 2005]

In our **view,** both the argument from causation and the argument from intention **go wrong by** overlook**ing** the distinctive features of government **as a moral** agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government.39 The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.40 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private actionfor example, private killing—becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it.

## Part 2: Plan

#### Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the State of Israel.

Volokh 16 [Eugene Volokh, teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation, “University of California Board of Regents is wrong about ‘anti-Zionism’ on campus,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/16/university-of-california-board-of-regents-is-wrong-about-anti-zionism-on-campus/?utm\_term=.cfab0cd93ad6] JW

The University of California Board of Regents has just released its Final Report of the Regents Working Group on Principles Against Intolerance, which includes a proposed set of such principles. I hope to blog some more about the actual proposal in the coming days, but what has made the news is the passage in the introduction to the report’s “Contextual Statement” that says: Fundamentally, commenters noted that historic manifestations of anti-Semitism have changed and that expressions of anti-Semitism are more coded and difficult to identify. In particular, opposition to Zionism[1] often is expressed in ways that are not simply statements of disagreement over politics and policy, but also assertions of prejudice and intolerance toward Jewish people and culture. Anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and other forms of discrimination have no place at the University of California…. [Footnote 1:] Merriam Webster defines Zionism as follows: an international movement originally for the establishment of a Jewish national or religious community in Palestine and later for the support of modern Israel…. The Oxford American Dictionary defines Zionism as follows: A movement for (originally) the reestablishment and (now) the development and protection of a Jewish nation in what is now Israel. I’m ethnically Jewish (I say “ethnically” because I’m not religious), and I support Israel. It’s the one democracy among its neighbors, and for all its flaws it’s doing a pretty good job faced with very difficult circumstances. Whatever one might say about whether Israel should have been created in 1948, it’s there, and undoing that decision would be a disaster in many ways. And I do think that a good deal of anti-Zionism is indeed anti-Semitic. But I think the regents are flat wrong to say that “anti-Zionism” has “no place at the University of California.” Even though they’re not outright banning anti-Zionist speech, but rather trying to sharply condemn it, I think such statements by the regents chill debate, especially by university employees and students who (unlike me) lack tenure. (For more on that, see here.) And this debate must remain free, regardless of what the regents or I think is the right position in the debate. Whether the Jewish people should have an independent state in Israel is a perfectly legitimate question to discuss — just as it’s perfectly legitimate to discuss whether Basques, Kurds, Taiwanese, Tibetans, Northern Cypriots, Flemish Belgians, Walloon Belgians, Faroese, Northern Italians, Kosovars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians, Transnistrians, Chechens, Catalonians, Eastern Ukranians and so on should have a right to have independent states. Sometimes the answer might be “yes.” Sometimes it might be “no.” Sometimes the answer might be “it depends.” But there’s no uncontroversial principle on which these questions can be decided. They have to be constantly up for inquiry and debate, especially in places that are set up for inquiry and debate: universities. Whether Israel is entitled to exist as an independent Jewish state is just as fitting a subject for discussion as whether Kosovo or Northern Cyprus or Kurdistan or Tawain or Tibet or a Basque nation should exist as an independent state for those ethnic groups. Of course, Israel is different from the other countries in that it has already been internationally recognized as an independent state. But while that’s an important practical argument, and an important argument under international law, it can’t determine what should be talked about at universities. International recognition can be granted, and it can be taken away. Certainly international recognition doesn’t conclusively resolve either moral or pragmatic questions about whether an ethnic group is entitled to a state of their own. The United Nations of 1947, or the great majority of the governments of today, may have been right or they may have been wrong. We can’t decide even for ourselves whether they’re right or wrong without hearing a lively debate about the subject. And certainly the University of California Board of Regents ought not prejudge this debate. I entirely agree that, to give an example given by the regents, “vandalism targeting property associated with Jewish people or Judaism” should be condemned and punished. I think that UCLA student government should not be allowed to discriminate against Jewish candidates for student government positions. And I agree, as I said, that some anti-Zionist speech and speakers are indeed hostile to Jews as an ethnic group, rather than just opposing a particular government or nation-state. But the regents should not be telling professors and students that “there is no place” at the University of California for a political viewpoint on the existence of Israel as a nation-state — a statement that is likely to and intended to deter debate on that subject. Indeed, universities are the very places where such matters should indeed be discussed.

#### Empirics prove that there is systemic obstruction of pro-Palestine activism at public colleges and universities

PL 15 [Palestine Legal, an independent organization dedicated to defending and advancing the civil rights and liberties of people in the US who speak out for Palestinian freedom, “The Palestine Exception,” September 2015, <http://palestinelegal.org/the-palestine-exception#notes>] JW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Over the last decade, a dynamic movement in support of Palestinian human rights, particularly active in US colleges and universities, has helped raise public awareness regarding the Israeli government’s violations of international law, as well as the role of corporations and the US government in facilitating these abuses. This activism, fueled by Israel’s increasingly destructive assaults on Gaza, presents a robust and sustainable challenge to the longstanding orthodoxy in the United States that excuses, justifies, and otherwise supports discriminatory Israeli government policies. Fearful of a shift in domestic public opinion, Israel’s fiercest defenders in the United States—a network of advocacy organizations, public relations firms, and think tanks—have intensified their efforts to stifle criticism of Israeli government policies. Rather than engage such criticism on its merits, these groups leverage their significant resources and lobbying power to pressure universities, government actors, and other institutions to censor or punish advocacy in support of Palestinian rights. In addition, high-level Israeli government figures, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and wealthy benefactors such as Sheldon Adelson and Haim Saban have reportedly participated in strategic meetings to oppose Palestine activism, particularly boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaigns. These heavy-handed tactics often have their desired effect, driving institutions to enact a variety of punitive measures against human rights activists, such as administrative sanctions, censorship, intrusive investigations, viewpoint-based restriction of advocacy, and even criminal prosecutions. Such efforts intimidate activists for Palestinian human rights, chill criticism of Israeli government practices, and impede a fair-minded dialogue on the pressing question of Palestinian rights. This Report, the first of its kind, documents the suppression of Palestine advocacy in the United States. In 2014, Palestine Legal—a nonprofit legal and advocacy organization supporting Palestine activism—responded to 152 incidents of censorship, punishment, or other burdening of advocacy for Palestinian rights and received 68 additional requests for legal assistance in anticipation of such actions. In the first six months of 2015 alone, Palestine Legal responded to 140 incidents and 33 requests for assistance in anticipation of potential suppression. These numbers understate the phenomenon, as many advocates who are unaware of their rights or afraid of attracting further scrutiny stay silent and do not report incidents of suppression. The overwhelming majority of these incidents—89 percent in 2014 and 80 percent in the first half of 2015—targeted students and scholars, a reaction to the increasingly central role universities play in the movement for Palestinian rights. The tactics used to silence advocacy for Palestinian rights frequently follow recognizable patterns. Activists and their protected speech are routinely maligned as uncivil, divisive, antisemitic, or supportive of terrorism. Institutional actors—primarily in response to pressure from Israel advocacy groups—erect bureaucratic barriers that thwart efforts to discuss abuses of Palestinian rights and occasionally even cancel events or programs altogether. Sometimes the consequences are more severe: universities suspend student groups, deny tenure to faculty, or fire them outright in response to their criticism of Israel. Meritless lawsuits and legal threats, which come from a variety of Israel advocacy groups identified in this Report, burden Palestinian rights advocacy and chill speech even when dismissed by the courts. Campaigns by such groups have even resulted in legislation to curtail Palestine advocacy, criminal investigations, and filing of charges against activists. Specifically, the Report documents the following tactics employed to undermine advocacy for Palestinian rights. False and Inflammatory Accusations of Antisemitism and Support for Terrorism: The Israel advocacy groups identified here devote considerable resources to monitoring the speech and activities of Palestinian rights advocates and falsely accusing them of antisemitism, based solely on their criticism of Israeli policy, in order to undermine their advocacy. Such conflation silences meaningful conversation about Palestinian rights and distracts from genuine forms of hatred and antisemitism. Some groups also accuse Arab-American, Muslim, and other Palestine solidarity activists of supporting or sympathizing with terrorism—an inflammatory charge often lodged without evidence. In 2015, for example, the anonymously run website Canary Mission published a list of organizations and activists it accused of supporting terrorism, including campus chapters of the Muslim Student Association, which it refers to as a “virtual terror factory.” The website seeks to “expose” individuals and student groups as “anti-Freedom, anti-American and anti-Semitic” to schools and prospective employers. Official Denunciation: In response to outside pressure, institutional actors sometimes pronounce official disapproval of the legitimate views and actions of Palestine advocates, frequently by unfairly characterizing Palestine activism, particularly support for BDS, as improperly “delegitimizing” Israel or as uncivil, divisive, or not conducive to dialogue. Such misleading framing, promoted by certain Israel advocacy groups and predominantly reserved for speech in support of Palestine, barely masks the officials’ underlying disagreement with the viewpoint of Palestine activists. In late 2014, for example, University of California president Janet Napolitano denounced a campaign which asked student government candidates to make an “ethics pledge” to refuse free trips from Israel advocacy groups as violating principles of “civility, respect, and inclusion.” Her predecessor, Mark Yudof, likened a peaceful protest against a talk by former Israeli soldiers to hanging nooses, drawing swastikas, and vandalizing a campus LGBTQIA center. Bureaucratic Barriers: University officials routinely erect administrative obstacles or abruptly alter school policies so as to hamper student organizing for Palestinian rights. These measures include creating impediments to reserving rooms and forcing students to obtain advance approval for events, pay security fees, and attend mandated meetings with administrators. Though seemingly neutral, these policies sometimes target and frequently disproportionately burden speech in favor of Palestinian rights. For example, in 2014, administrators at The City University of New York’s (CUNY) College of Staten Island repeatedly called members of Students for Justice in Palestine and their faculty advisor into meetings to question them about events and social media postings, urged the group to hold events alongside Israel advocacy groups, and instructed members to submit promotional flyers for official authorization. Cancellations and Alterations of Academic and Cultural Events: From campus lectures and community discussions to art and film exhibitions, public events critical of Israeli policy often come under attack, forcing organizers to cancel, move, or substantially alter the programs. Israel advocacy groups frequently contend that programs lack “balance” or are antisemitic. For example, in the spring of 2015, the Missouri History Museum decided, after receiving complaints from Israel advocacy organizations, that an event on solidarity between activists working for justice in Ferguson, Mexico, and Palestine could not proceed unless organizers removed references to Palestine. In 2012, the University of California’s Hastings Law School withdrew its official support of a conference entitled “Litigating Palestine” after being pressured by Israel advocacy groups. Administrative Sanctions: Universities often respond to complaints from Israel advocacy groups by investigating and disproportionately disciplining students and student groups for events and actions in support of Palestinian rights. For example, Loyola University Chicago launched an investigation into the school’s chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) in fall 2014, after students lined up at a Birthright Israel table to ask questions that highlighted the discriminatory nature of the program, which excludes non-Jews. After a lengthy investigation, university administrators ultimately suspended the SJP group for the remainder of the year for failing to register the “demonstration.” Yet the administration chose not to suspend the campus Hillel chapter for similarly failing to register its tabling event, instead merely requiring the chapter group to meet with administrators to review school policy. In spring 2014, Northeastern University in Boston suspended a student group after members distributed flyers describing Israel’s policy of demolishing Palestinian homes. Public outcry and the threat of legal action, however, forced the university to reverse course and reinstate the group. Threats to Academic Freedom: Israel advocacy groups often target academics critical of Israeli policies or supportive of Palestinian rights. Campaigns against faculty — from Columbia University to the University of California at Los Angeles — sully reputations, instigate university investigations, and can even lead to termination of employment. For example, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, succumbing to pressure from Israel advocacy groups and donors, summarily dismissed Professor Steven Salaita from a tenured faculty position at the outset of the fall 2014 semester because it deemed his personal tweets criticizing Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza to be “uncivil.” San Francisco State University launched an investigation of Professor Rabab Abdulhadi in spring 2014, forcing her to defend a research trip to Palestine, after an Israel advocacy group accused her of abusing taxpayer funds and meeting with “known terrorists.” In fall 2014, the AMCHA Initiative, an Israel advocacy group, issued a blacklist of more than 200 Middle East Studies professors it declared to be “anti-Israel.”

## Part 3: Advantages

### Advantage 1: Racism

#### a) Islamophobia: Suppression of pro-Palestine movements on campus denies Palestinian students the ability to form solidarity

Nadeau & Sears 11 [Mary-Jo Nadeau and Alan Sears, Mary-Jo Nadeau teaches at the Department of Sociology, University of Toronto-Mississauga. Alan Sears teaches at the Department of Sociology, Ryerson University, Toronto. “This Is What Complicity Looks Like: Palestine and the Silencing Campaign on Campus,” The Bullet, March 5, 2011, http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/475.php] JW

The silencing campaign is particularly dangerous given the overall political climate, which facilitates the neoliberalization of education. The goal of neoliberalism in post-secondary education is to make the universities serve exclusively economic goals, preparing students for the corporate workplace and creating know-how that can be commercialized. This requires a serious culture shift on campuses. One of the core political projects of neoliberalism on campus has been to roll back the spaces for campus activism and freedom of expression originally won by student militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. The campus silencing campaign against Palestine solidarity aligns in important ways with this neoliberal agenda, shutting down political spaces in the interest of a narrow vocational conception of education. Campus equity movements are particular targets in this broader effort, as they have won a certain limited space for themselves, and often critique the limits of the dominant forms of academic knowledge. The silencing campaign around Palestine solidarity organizing has played a leading role in the attack on freedom of expression on campuses. There are in fact two ideas of academic freedom and campus freedom of expression at stake. The first is the narrow and professional conception of academic freedom, which stresses the right of the professor to conduct free inquiry within his or her own specific realm of expertise and to disseminate the results of that inquiry through publication or teaching. This sense of academic freedom informs the influential “Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure” developed in the U.S. in 1915. The second, and more recent, conception of campus freedom of expression and academic freedom was won through struggles from below by the radical student movement of the 1960s. The freedom struggles of African-Americans galvanized activists, including students who fought for the right to build solidarity campaigns on campuses. This was strongly opposed by university administrations, who sought to keep activist politics safely off campus. Nowhere was this struggle sharper than at the Berkeley campus of University of California. There, the Free Speech Movement fought for political rights on campus, challenging the administration of Clark Kerr who was perhaps the most prominent advocate of the technocratic university serving the needs of corporations and the state. Clark Kerr was, in many ways, the forerunner of the current neoliberal strategy of reorganizing universities to focus more clearly on the service of business and the lean state. In the 1960s, Kerr was actually defeated by a mass, militant student movement. But the technocratic vision that the radical student movement of the 1960s successfully defended against has returned in new and aggressive forms under neoliberalism. And part of this agenda is to politically cleanse campuses, stripping away the political rights students won through militancy in the 1960s. The attack on Palestine solidarity is a leading thrust in the current campaign to roll back campus political expression and to define academic freedom in narrow professional terms. The Iacobucci report at York, discussed below, is an important example of this logic. The gains of campus equity movements since the 1960s pose an important obstacle to the narrow definition of academic freedom. Serious struggles against racism, sexism and heterosexism necessarily raise questions about the nature of knowledge and its supposed objectivity. These movements show the ways fundamental inequalities distort knowledge, often in unrecognized ways. Equity movements therefore challenge the conception of expertise that underlies the narrow definition of academic freedom, arguing that the person who experiences systemic inequality often sees it more clearly than someone in a privileged position. As the case for Israeli policy has become harder to make after five years of the highly effective Palestinian-led global Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, pro-Israel advocacy organizations have sought to shut down their opponents through silencing. In doing so, they are not only attempting yet again to shut down any expression of Palestinian experience, but also to weaken protections for freedom of expression and narrow the conception of academic freedom. This is a serious attack, and one that resonates with the neoliberal restructuring of the universities.

#### Attempts to conflate anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism leads to campaigns by pro-Israel groups that demean and marginalize Muslim-American students

Solomon 16 [Daniel J. Solomon, “Inflammatory Pro-Israel Posters Pop Up on Campus — Are They Islamophobic?,” Forward, October 26, 2016, http://forward.com/news/national/352698/inflammatory-pro-israel-posters-pop-up-on-campus-are-they-islamophobic/] JW

A row over Israel on campus is as predictable as the fall of autumn leaves, and it’s no different this season. Fliers accusing pro-Palestinian students of being anti-Semitic have cropped at numerous colleges in October — including the University of Chicago, Tufts University, Brooklyn College and Berkeley — and have been claimed by the David Horowitz Freedom Center, a rightwing organization labeled a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center. “Do you want to show your support for Hamas terrorists whose stated goal whose stated goal is the elimination of the Jewish people and the Jewish state? Join us! Students for Justice in Palestine at Tufts University.” read one flier procured by the Tufts Daily. It also featured a Palestinian militant wrapped in a keffiyeh, or traditional headscarf and toting a machine gun. Other posters included specific callouts to individual faculty and students, accusing them of collaboration with jihadists. According to the anti-Zionist site Electronic Intifada, a flier at San Francisco State University labeled one professor “a leader of the Hamas BDS campaign,” while one at Berkeley said that a professor was a “supporter of Hamas terrorists” and an “Islamophobia alarmist.” Most of the posters featured the slogan #Jewhatred and directed people to the Freedom Center’s Web site. Horowitz’s organization has been termed a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which has described Horowitz as “a driving force of the anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, and anti-black movements.” According to Electronic Intifada, the current poster campaign was preceded by a smaller episode last spring at the University of California–Los Angeles, where the group circulated similar fliers. Critics of the posters — both campus administrators and others — have said they create an atmosphere of fear. “This is not an issue of free speech; this is bullying behavior that is unacceptable and will not be tolerated on our campus,” Leslie Wong, the president of San Francisco State, said in a comment run by Electronic Intifada. Joanne Barker, a professor at the university, told the Web site that her school “should be contacting federal and state authorities to investigate this incident as a hate crime.” Recently, some rightwing Israel advocates have adopted more hard-nosed tactics intended to publicly shame and sanction their perceived enemies. Created last year, one such effort, the Canary Mission, has compiled dossiers on hundreds of students and faculty that it sees as anti-Israel or anti-Semitic – often conflating the two. Another new organization, the Amcha Initiative, has an “anti-Semitism tracker” on its Web site that puts calls for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against the Jewish state (BDS) in the same category as Jew-hatred. This also comes on the heels of a controversy at Berkeley, where students and faculty clashed with one another over a course that presented Zionism as a “settler colonialist” movement.

#### b) Anti-Semitism: Conflating criticism of Israel with criticism of Jews opens up Jewish students to attacks based on Israel’s actions

Benin 04 [Joel Benin, Professor of Middle East History at Stanford University and a former president of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, “The new American McCarthyism: policing thought about the Middle East,” Institute of Race Relations 0306-3968 Vol. 46(1), 1004] JW

Academic freedom and open debate on Middle East-related issues were very badly served by the widely reported sloppy thinking of Harvard University President Lawrence Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration. At the start of the 2002–03 academic year, he addressed a student prayer meeting and argued that harsh criticisms of Israel were ‘anti-Semitic in their effect if not their intent’.21 Among other things, Summers was referring to a petition signed by 600 Harvard and MIT faculty, staff and students to divest university funds from companies that do business in Israel, as a protest against Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Similar efforts with a range of formulations of the target were subsequently launched at over forty colleges and universities. One need not support the substance of the demand for divestment in order to discern the difference between anti-Semitism and even the most vehement criticism of Israel. Whatever one thinks of the demand for divestment, it is directed at specific policies of the state of Israel. It is, therefore, not inherently anti-Semitic. Summers may have thought that he was expressing himself in a reasoned way to an academic audience. But the conflation of criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism was an already well-established ploy. The endorsement of this notion by the president of the country’s most prestigious institution of higher learning authorised others to go on the political offensive without fear that they would be criticised as boorish enemies of academic freedom. The ADL, the Likud-affiliated Zionist Organization of America, the American Jewish Committee and the Hillel Foundation (the parent body of the largest Jewish student organisation) have sought to convince federal legislators that there is a wave of anti-Semitism on American campuses. The ADL’s ‘annual audit’ of anti-Semitic activity in America detected an increase of 24 per cent in anti-Semitic activities on US college campuses during 2002.22 However, the entire increase in incidents of anti-Semitism on US campuses, according to the ADL’s own statistics, amounted to twenty-one actions. Among these were several high-profile incidents, most of them motivated by opposition to Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. Paradoxically, by failing to make a clear distinction between anti-Semitism, which should always and everywhere be opposed, and anti-Zionism, which is a legitimate political opinion, the ADL and like-minded organisations exposed American Jews to attack because they were identified with Israel.

#### Far right positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict that lead to censorship are also what justify marginalization within Jewish communities. Empirics with Hillel International prove

JVP 15 [Jewish Voice for Peace, “STIFLING DISSENT HOW ISRAEL’S DEFENDERS USE FALSE CHARGES OF ANTI-SEMITISM TO LIMIT THE DEBATE OVER ISRAEL ON CAMPUS,” Fall 2015, <https://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/JVP_Stifling_Dissent_Full_Report_Key_90745869.pdf>] JW

On college campuses across the country, there has been a concerted effort to purge anyone supporting BDS or Palestinian rights from mainstream Jewish organizations. In many places, involvement in the Jewish community has become dependent on passing an ideological litmus test. It is no exaggeration to say that this process often mimics McCarthyism -- the period of time in the 1950s when political activists were “blacklisted” and accused of treason or disloyalty by the US government -- in its stridency and intensity. 2.1 Hillel’s Israel Guidelines Hillel is the world’s largest Jewish student organization and is active on more than 550 colleges and universities worldwide. Their stated mission is to “enrich the lives of Jewish undergraduate and graduate students” and to provide a place for people to participate in Jewish communal life on campus. Hillel had traditionally been a home for all Jews, regardless of politics. But in 2010, Hillel International issued new guidelines on Israel, stating that “Hillel will not partner with, house, or host organizations, groups, or speakers that as a matter of policy or practice: •Deny the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state with secure and recognized borders; •Delegitimize, demonize, or apply a double standard to Israel; •Support boycott of, divestment from, or sanctions against the State of Israel; •Exhibit a pattern of disruptive behavior towards campus events or guest speakers or foster an atmosphere of incivility.”11 Hillel’s guidelines encapsulate the pervasive campus atmosphere of ongoing exclusion, marginalization and defamation of Jews whose politics don’t serve the mainstream Jewish agenda on Israel, which is – largely – not to interfere with Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, or inside of Israel. Hillel claims that any individual Jewish student is welcome within Hillel, regardless of that student’s politics. What is explicitly unwelcome is that student’s right to organize for Palestinian rights and to end the Israeli occupation using tactics that are outside of the pro-Israel consensus – a consensus that refrains from confronting Israel too directly. In his op-ed announcing the guidelines, Hillel International CEO Wayne Firestone emphasized a commitment to pluralism in the Jewish community and invoked the Jewish tradition of Talmudic debate as a way to argue that Hillel supports a plethora of political opinion, despite the guidelines. Yet the guidelines explicitly exclude particular views from inclusion within the formal Jewish community. When the guidelines were announced, JVP’s Cecilie Surasky predicted, “These new restrictive guidelines will only further alienate an increasing number of young Jewish students from Hillels, especially those who passionately embrace the values of justice and equality.” Surasky was entirely correct in her prediction. Soon after the guidelines were passed, Brandeis Hillel rejected the campus Jewish Voice for Peace chapter from Hillel membership; a student leader at SUNY Binghamton was forced to resign from Hillel after co-sponsoring an campus event highlighting the Palestinian popular struggle against the Israeli occupation; and Harvard Hillel refused to host an event featuring Israeli politician Avraham Burg because the cosponsor fell outside of the Hillel guidelines. Countless other events, potential student partnerships, and open discussions were no doubt quashed by the guidelines’ heavy shadow. The new student organization Open Hillel was formed in 2012 in response to the pressure put on students to conform to Hillel’s Israel guidelines. Seeking the elimination of the guidelines and dedicated to open discourse, Open Hillel is organizing on college campuses across the country.12 Case studies below look in detail at the ways in which these boundaries limit debate, marginalize dissent, and exclude students from participating in campus iJewish life.

### Advantage 2: Civic Engagement

#### a) Encouraging discourse about foreign policy toward Israel-Palestine is uniquely good because it builds coalitions across all racial groups to inspire new dialogues. The aff spills over to other reform movements

Hallward & Shaver 12 [Maia Carter Hallward and Patrick Shaver, Associate Professor of Middle East Politics at American university, “‘‘WAR by other Means’’ or Nonviolent Resistance? Examining the Discourses Surrounding Berkeley’s Divestment Bill,” Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research, July 2012] JW

Finally, proponents and opponents differed in their approaches to power. Opponents of the bill in the Jewish community on and off campus focused their efforts on the power hierarchy, targeting the president of the student government, president of the university, and parents of upcoming high school seniors who may be considering the university in the future. In contrast, supporters of the divestment bill were more focused on the grassroots, on the campus community, on networks within the broader Bay Area, such as the dock workers who later refused to unload an Israeli ship. Supporters of the bill repeatedly emphasized that BDS was one of the small steps they could take owing to their lack of power in the conventional sense, and they reached out to those with positional power or influence (such Nobel Prize Laureate Desmond Tutu) to try to strengthen their cause. By reaching out to a broad coalition of minority groups on campus, seeking to engage Muslims and Jews, Latinos and African-Americans, the supporters of divestment sought to build a force for change in the name of justice. This coalition building across ethnic and other lines of division parallels the strategies used by Berkeley students during the antiapartheid era.93 Other Jewish groups on campus, like Tikvah Students for Israel, joined forces with Evangelical Christians, orthodox Jewish students, and the Berkeley College Republicans in a call for ending divisive debates and ensuring that Jewish students feel safe and not marginalized on campus. These two rival coalitions of students used very different language to discuss the issues at hand and to frame the debate, with supporters emphasizing the human rights abuses of the occupation and the U.S. corporations supplying weapons and opponents focusing on dialogue and ‘‘peace.’’ Regardless, the power of BDS was clearly indicated in the size of the crowds attending and their willingness to endure all night sessions, as well as the extent of involvement of the Israeli consul for the Northwest. On a broader level, the case illustrates the challenges of democratic decision making in terms of the question of representation and authority. What was originally a relatively unremarkable student government decision became the subject of national, even international, attention after the president’s veto and ensuing debates that were opened to the public. While some saw this as an excellent example of democracy in action by expanding the space for discourse and providing in-depth dialogue conducted in a generally civil manner (with a few exceptions), others questioned whether the bill went beyond the scope of the student government’s role, and others wondered about the role of external forces in decision making. Looking at the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict and questions of democratic accountability, the case raises questions regarding how difficult political decisions are made and the role of elected leaders in soliciting (or not) external opinion and the role of that external process on the final decision-making process. A second, related point, involves the extent to which the outcome itself, or the educational process leading to that final decision, has more of an impact on community relations and potential for socio-political change. Although opponents of the divestment bill ultimately ‘‘won’’ since the veto was not overturned, the public discourse and attention received in the process contributed to a momentum that spilled over onto other campuses and other California BDS initiatives.

#### b) Israeli companies abuse West Bank occupation for their own profit while exploiting and suppressing local Palestinians. Every dollar that the divestment strategy gains translates into increased welfare in Palestine

Press 16 [Eyal Press, author of “Beautiful Souls: The Courage and Conscience of Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times, “When ‘Made in Israel’ Is a Human Rights Abuse,” New York Times, January 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/opinion/when-made-in-israel-is-a-human-rights-abuse.html?\_r=0] JW

From a biblical perspective, this view may be tenable. From a legal and moral perspective, it is not. As documented in a new report by Human Rights Watch, Israel’s occupation has grown into a lucrative business, exploited by companies as part of a system that is unlawful and abusive. Like the settlers, these enterprises receive benefits from the Israeli government — preferential access to land and water, low rents — that make the occupied territories an alluring destination. It is another story for Palestinians, who are routinely denied permits to open their own businesses, cut off from their land and hemmed in by restrictions that, according to the World Bank, cost the Palestinian economy $3.4 billion a year. All of these businesses are operating on illegally occupied land. A significant amount of land, it turns out. There are roughly 1,000 factories in the chain of Israeli-administered “industrial zones” strung across the West Bank. The geographic footprint of these commercial enterprises, together with shopping centers and agricultural projects, exceeds the built-up areas of settler housing. Continue reading the main story Some Israeli officials have argued that Palestinians benefit by working in settlement businesses, producing what one factory owner calls “goods of peace.” But many work in settlements only because Israel’s stifling of the Palestinian economy has deprived them of alternatives. Because the government rarely conducts labor inspections, Palestinian workers often earn less than the Israeli minimum wage. If workers complain, employers sometimes retaliate by fabricating a “security incident” that will deprive Palestinians of their work permits, according to the H.R.W. report. To view goods made under these conditions as no different than products made within Israel requires going blind to such indignities. Unfortunately, that is exactly what new legislation that will soon land on President Obama’s desk would require the United States government to do. Under a provision of a larger piece of legislation, popularly known as the Customs Bill, that has been approved by the House and is expected to soon pass the Senate, American officials will be obligated to treat the settlements as part of Israel in future trade negotiations.

## Part 4: Theory

### T Pre-empts

1. Use reasonability on T and theory. The brightline is if I show that you could have predicted this aff and there are 7 minutes of link turns to this AC, I am fair. Contradictory definitions of any means neg can always read T on this topic. The neg can always call for more or less specification, depending on the 1AC advocacy. This kills topic discussion because negs are incentivized to always layer the case debate with T and skews time because 1AR’s are always forced to restart.

2. Re-evaluate the debate as whole-res under neg T interps:

A) key to checking neg flex—bidirectional interps means you can always shift the debate to a preclusive layer. This skews 1AR time because I’m forced to win both theory and case debate and you can go for either in the 2N.

B) key to reciprocity—. I can’t read T against the neg so it’s a strategy that only the neg gets access too—making it game over allows neg to abuse that power.

C) maximizes topical education since reject debater ends the debate on theory and encourages 1ar to collapse to RVI. Rejecting arg ensures we can continue discussing the topic.

3. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

4. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

5. Cambridge Dictionary defines any in context of resolution as

(Cambridge Dictionary, online dictionary, “Definition of ‘any’,” http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/any/)

(**used in negative statements** and questions) **some, or even the smallest amount** (of)

## Part 5: Method

1. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

2. Contesting the policy focus on the AC is bad, prefer the AC framework as long as it is theoretically legitimate.

A: it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense, which destroys aff, ground.

B: Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education.

C: Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

3. We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence.

Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando, The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

4. The narrative of “no progress” is affectively appealing but historically imprecise. Political access proves.

**Winant 15**– (2015, Howard, Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Barbara, “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324).

The World-Historical Shitpile of Race Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet That’s Not the Whole Story We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap,people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: • Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet • The destruction of the old European empires • The coming and going of the Cold War • The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he [sic] must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 [1922]). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics. It continues to shape what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations, the undeniable achievements of anti-racist and ant-imperialist struggles, the extension of democracy – often tortuous and always incomplete

5. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence.

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences.

7. Aff isn’t roleplaying- I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.

# Frontlines- Case

## Impact Add-Ons

### Hate Crimes

#### Islamophobia empirically leads to hate crimes, fractures communities, and increases national security threats.

**Foran 16** [Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Rise of Anti-Muslim Violence, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-muslims-islamophobia-hate-crime/500840/]

A new report from California State University-San Bernardino’s Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism suggests that political rhetoric may play a role in mitigating or fueling hate crimes. The report shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes in the U.S. rose sharply in 2015 to the highest levels since the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks. It also suggests that Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric could have contributed to this backlash against American Muslims. “There’s very compelling evidence that political rhetoric may well play a role in directing behavior in the aftermath of a terrorist attack,” Brian Levin, the author of the report said in an interview. “I don’t think we can dismiss contentions that rhetoric is one of the significant variables that can contribute to hate crimes.” The report from the non-partisan center examined the incidence of hate crimes in the aftermath of two reactions to terrorism from political leaders. First, George W. Bush’s speech following the 9/11 attacks declaring: “Islam is peace” and “the face of terror is not the true faith of Islam,” and the second, Trump calling for a ban on Muslims entering the U.S. after the San Bernardino terror attack. The report found a steep rise in hate crimes following Trump’s remarks and a significant drop in hate crimes after Bush’s speech, relative to the number of hate crimes immediately following the initial terror attacks. A wide array of factors contribute to the incidence of hate crimes. Ignorance and isolation may play a role; most Americans say they do not personally know any Muslims, although those who do report positive views of Muslims in general. The nature of the threat groups of people are perceived to pose can also be a factor; prejudice catalyzed by a terrorist attack, for example, may be particularly likely to inspire hate crimes. Political rhetoric is only one ingredient in that mix, and the many messages in circulation after an attack can make it harder to determine the impact of any one particular reaction from a political leader. Before Trump’s call for a ban on Muslims entering the country, President Obama delivered a speech to the nation on the San Bernardino attack stressing tolerance. Still, the report looked at daily data following terrorist attacks, and found that “a tolerant statement about Muslims by a political leader was accompanied by a sharp decline in hate crime, while a less tolerant announcement was followed by a precipitous increase in both the severity and number of anti-Muslim hate crimes.” It notes that “there have been very few incidents of actual hate crime where Mr. Trump’s name was uttered since his candidacy,” but adds that “the increase of 87.5% in anti-Muslim hate crime in the days directly following his announcement is a troubling development and worthy of concern.” Aside from calling for a ban on Muslims entering the the United States, Trump has said that “Islam hates us,” and accused American Muslims of protecting terrorists. The research does not demonstrate a direct causal link, nor can it rule out the role of other factors. It’s possible that the documented increase reflects an increase in hate-crime reporting due to heightened awareness of Islamophobia, which has become a topic of discussion during the presidential race. Nevertheless, the research does raise the possibility that Islamophobic political rhetoric may have devastating consequences. A Georgetown University report released in May similarly found that threats, intimidation and violence against Muslim Americans have surged over the course of the presidential election. Engy Abdelkader, the author of the report, believes that trend is linked to Trump’s political rise. “Trump has seized on people’s fears and anxieties,” Abdelkader said. “I think that has translated in a number of instances not just to hostility, but acts of violence.”

### Islamophobia

#### Post 9/11, pro-Palestine movements were conflated with Jihadism leading to rampant Islamophobia which the university took an active role in. At a time where Islamophobia is being peddled at massive scale, dissent from the other side is key to breaking down the specter of the Muslim as a terrorist other.

Bazian 15 [Bazian, Hatem. "The Islamophobia Industry and the Demonization of Palestine: Implications for American Studies." American Quarterly 67.4 (2015): 1057-1066] JW

The 2001 attacks introduced a shift in US foreign policy and introduced a more muscular and military interventionist approach toward the Arab and Muslim world with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a robust US military presence in over thirty new countries.14 The coinciding of the 9/11 attacks with the start of the second Palestinian Intifada presented a golden opportunity for a strong cadre of neoconservatives connected to the American Enterprise Institute to push for a more decisively pro-Israeli stand in the Bush administration.15 The top tier of the Bush administration adopted a neoconservative line of thinking.16 The neoconservatives in the administration were committed to Israel’s defense and opposed to territorial compromise with the Palestinians; several had participated in drafting the “Clean Break” strategy in 1998.17 The post–September 11 shift focused on a preemptive strategy directed at what they called “terrorist” organizations with global reach and nation-states that provide support or shelter to groups, such as Al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations, but not groups engaged in national struggles like Palestinian factions and the Basque separatists in Spain. President Bush’s “either you are with us or with the terrorists” framing forced nation-states to make policy decisions to facilitate access to execute this global war. The global alliance that emerged cooperated in the “War on Terror,” with Israel playing a central role, providing training and know-how and marketing its “extensive expertise” in fighting terrorism. Israel’s security agencies jumped into the counterterrorism-training business and managed to become key players in local, regional, national, and international joint terrorism programs. For example, Urban Shield, a jointcounterterrorism training program held in the San Francisco Bay Area, which centers Islamophobia in its conceptual framework and posits Muslims and Arabs as potential threats in its training program, has the Israeli security team playing a major role in setting the scenarios for supposed terrorist attacks and providing guidance on how to profile terrorists.18 Israel was a key participant in the War on Terror, highlighting the “Iraqi threat” that was presented as directly “linked” to the funding of suicide bombings. Critical to the Iraq campaign was a communication strategy devised by US pro-Israel supporters to influence public opinion and maintain the focus on Saddam Hussein while managing to intensify a negative view of the Pales- tinians. PR firms like the Luntz Research Companies pushed public opinion farther to the right and in support of the Iraq invasion as a way to defend Israel. The PR document prepared by this organization offered specific talking points and recommendations on how to speak about Israel to the US public.19 While some might point to a conspiracy, the reality is that a well-organized, disciplined, and well-funded Zionist and neoconservative network operated in an ideologically fertile and supportive administration with allies in sensitive positions who managed to shape public debates on issues pertaining to war at home and abroad. Indeed, those who operated in this space managed to refortify and again consolidate Israel’s narrative in the United States and dominate the discourse inside academe, including American studies. Israeli spokespeople were very effective in deploying their messaging at the local, regional, and national levels in the United States, while the pro-Palestine responses were often delayed and singular in nature. The communication strategy was built on years of negative stereotyping, and misrepresentation of Arabs and Muslims made the language easier to deploy in an existing productive and orientalist materiality. Edward Said (Orientalism [1978] and Covering Islam [1981]) and Jack Shaheen (Reel Bad Arabs [2001]) ground the subject and point to the cumulative effect of such pro-Israeli strategies. The pro-Israel communication strategy was deployed in existing racist and essentialist representations of Arabs and Muslims, which, in post-9/11, were successfully focused on Palestinians in general and Hamas in particular as the archetypal terrorist. This communication strategy made it possible for Israel to become more connected to US policy formations in fighting the War on Terror. More precisely, Israel’s know-how on fighting Palestinian “terrorism” was peddled and packaged as the best and most successful approach to dealing with a fomented Islamic threat. Overnight, Israel became the model for such a strategy with the emergence of numerous Israel-linked corporate outfits offering training services and counterterrorism strategies that helped consolidate the stereotypical image of the Arab, Muslim, and most definitely Palestinian terrorist across the United States, as joint terrorism task forces and intelligence agencies adopted wholesale the Israeli security framework and thus Israeli communication strategy, with many taking up training courses or visiting Israel with a distinctive and hostile view of Arabs and Muslims upon their return.20 Consequently, the US academy was brought into the same project with immediate development of courses that further problematize Islam and Muslims as archetypal terrorists, investment in teaching the Arabic language as a necessary service to the national security apparatus, and cooperation with Israeli institutions on studying violence and counterterrorism. In addition, several key Islamophobic figures became regular guests at universities, including a select group of Muslims connected and funded by the same Islamophobic industry.21 The result is that Islam and Muslims are studied in the academy as an inferior and terrorist “other” in need of interventions and remedies. Furthermore, the ever-present link to the questions or concerns of Israel-affiliated scholars dominate the framing of Islam and Muslims in the US academy, with a constant litmus test applied to individual scholars on Israel and Palestine, as the latest case of Salaita firing illustrates this point clearly.22 Further, almost all US top leaders have visited Israel to get “educated” about the challenges facing the country and Israel’s effectiveness in fighting “terrorism.” The fully funded trips to Israel by US politicians, journalists, and academics are designed to shape public discourse, since the participants begin to use Israeli talking points when discussing Palestine, Arabs, and Muslims. The participants who went on these fully paid tours included a large number of university presidents and top administrative leaders on campus.23 These trips and Israeli securitized training programs are designed to increase support for Israel and have diverse spokespeople who can influence public opinion and maintain hegemonic backing for Israel in the United States. Recently, Shalom Hartman Institute’s Muslim Leadership Initiative began to target American Muslim leaders for fully funded trips.24

#### The unchallenged pro-Israel lobby is a violent manifestation of latent Islamophobia. Academia is key to disrupt this process.

Bazian 15 [Bazian, Hatem. "The Islamophobia Industry and the Demonization of Palestine: Implications for American Studies." American Quarterly 67.4 (2015): 1057-1066] JW

In a recent article analyzing a host of survey results since 2001, Charles Kurzman concludes that the data illustrate how “American attitudes toward Muslim Americans have grown more negative” and that “a growing segment of the . . . population is willing to express negative views about Muslim Americans in recent years.”28 More alarmingly, the data show that the percentage of Americans responding unfavorably to Muslims in general has steadily increased since 2006. The survey results raise important questions about the causes for such a shift, the forces behind it, and how best to reverse it in the future. Indeed, the alarming data reflect the success of the Islamophobia industry and its massive investment in demonizing Muslims as a launching pad for pro-Israel groups from which to maintain US unconditional support for Israel. One way to understand the unfolding pro-Israel strategy is to extend Edward Said’s use of “Latent” and “Manifest Orientalism” to the study of Islamophobia. Said argued that Arab and Muslim subjects are constructed and “judged in terms of, and in comparison to, the West, so they are always the Other, the conquerable, and the inferior.”29 Kurzman’s and Said’s writings bring into focus the link between what I refer to as latent and manifest Islamophobia.30 Latent Islamophobia is conceived through an inception process using films, news reports, media talking heads, book publishing, and emphasis on Islam as a violent, backward, and oppressive religion inclined toward despotism and lack of progress. Culture production is not independent of politics or economy; rather, it is informed and hegemonically determined by it. Manifest Islamophobia is evident in the speeches and writing of Daniel Pipes, a right-wing Israel supporter and founder of the McCarthyite-type web site Campus Watch. Speaking before the convention of the American Jewish Congress on October 21, 2001, Pipes stated, “I worry very much from the Jewish point of view that the presence, and increased stature, and affluence, and enfranchisement of American Muslims. . . . will present true dangers to American Jews.”31 This offers a glimpse into some of the thinking behind the Islamophobia industry and how it mobilizes to demonize of Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians. Conclusion Academe should take the lead in exploring the entanglement of the pro-Israel groups and organizations in Islamophobia content production. Scholars in American studies should centralize research and teaching about Islamophobia because of the impact it has in normalizing racist discourses in society. I urge American studies scholars to be at the forefront and earnestly embrace Islamophobia studies with intersectionality and connectedness to all struggles for social justice while also affirming the centrality of Palestine’s narrative in the field. In this regard, the forum on Palestine in American studies can play a vital role in collaboratively addressing the Islamophobia crisis with regular panels at the annual conference and regional academic workshops on how to teach and counter it on campus and community levels through partnerships with the American Cultures Community Engaged Scholarship. Lastly, American studies scholars should build robust academic relations with Palestinian universities, foster exchange programs, and proactively seek to centralize Palestinian narratives in the conversation and expose Israel’s role in promoting a racist and hostile campus and civil society environments that seek to limit academic freedom and speech while hiding behind distortions about BDS, Palestine, Islam, Muslims and the “War on Terror.”32

### Israel/Palestine

#### Attempts to censor anti-Israeli speech is an attempt to “normalize” what is not normal. The way Israel maintains its oppression is through normalization of its practices. Opening up dialogue allows the international community to disrupt the image that Israel’s practices are normal.

Azzam 16 [Zeina Azzam, “Israel as Oppressor, Palestine as Oppressed: The ‘normalization’ of what is not normal,” Mondoweiss, June 14, 2016, http://mondoweiss.net/2016/06/palestine-oppressed-normalization/#sthash.NK3kIYHC.dpuf

Indeed, objectivity often seems to be absent in situations in which people have been accustomed to a longstanding status quo, even if it is unjust, inhumane, or illegal. Although sociologist Diane Vaughan’s theory of the “normalization of deviance” is usually applied to organizational dynamics, it can also shed light on behavior in larger communities and social groupings, such as Israelis and Palestinians. This theory posits that over time, people become so used to frequent “deviant” behavior that they stop considering it as such, and in fact start to regard it as “a normal occurrence.” There are many notorious examples of this theory; the one most frequently cited is the history of a design flaw (the infamous O-rings) in the space shuttle program that led to the Challenger’s explosion thirty years ago and the death of all the astronauts on board. Vaughan argued that it was NASA’s culture of dismissing what seemed to be inconsequential—though growing—problems, over time, which paved the way for the Challenger disaster. The back page of her book notes that, “history, power, and politics combined to create a disastrous mistake.” A parallel situation can be seen at the highest levels of the Israeli government. The pernicious and public maligning of Palestinians by Israeli lawmakers has become so commonplace that it is hardly questioned or noticed anymore—inside Israel or by the world community. Historian and political analyst Vijay Prashad writes: Netanyahu’s cabinet reeks of hate speech. His Deputy Defense Minister Rabbi Eli Ben Dahan said of Palestinians in 2013, “To me they are like animals; they aren’t human.” Last year, Israel’s Welfare Minister Haim Katz said, “The land of Israel is whole. There is no Palestine.” He said that the Palestinians should go off to Jordan. Israel’s Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon denied the Palestinians the basic elements of humanity. Israelis mourn their dead, he said earlier this year, while Palestinians “seek death,” living in a “society that respects nothing.” Israel’s Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked compared Palestinians to “snakes” and called for their destruction, “They have to die.” Neither has Netanyahu distanced himself from this hateful language, nor have the supporters of Israel been called to account for such talk. It passes as normal. How is it that high level Israeli lawmakers can denigrate Palestinians to such extremes, and the international community accepts their statements? Vaughan’s theory is useful in that it takes into account history, power, and politics, but one could say that it does not go far enough in the Israel-Palestinian context because it suggests that decision makers are often subtly influenced by each other and may realize their mistakes only in hindsight. In fact, it is evident that Israeli government officials make purposeful and clear-cut statements, decisions, and laws that dehumanize and oppress Palestinians living both in the occupied territories and in Israel. These are calculated choices. The principal concept of the normalization of deviant practices (which can also be termed unjust, undemocratic, and colonial practices) applies very well in the Palestinian case, as Israel’s goal is to be treated as a “normal” state despite its objectively aberrant treatment of the Palestinians. Clearly, therefore, its oppressive practices in the occupied territories, entrenched military occupation, and apartheid-like policies toward Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and inside Israel should make the international community constantly vigilant and critical of Israel’s modus operandi. Normalizing the Abnormal Efforts at reconciling the two sides of the conflict have been criticized for using the present and seemingly “normalized” state of affairs as a starting point, and for not recognizing Israel’s historically unjust and harmful policies. Last year, for example, Palestinian activists protested a conference to discuss an initiative called “Two States, One Homeland,” saying that it implicitly legitimizes West Bank settlements, which is a form of normalization. (It is interesting to note that the conference group of speakers and discussants also included settlers.) A member of the popular struggle committee opposing the initiative, Mahmoud Zuwara, explained, “I am in contact with hundreds of Israelis, and very much support our cooperation with them. But the way to do this is through a joint effort, through a joint popular struggle. Israelis need to work out in the open, under the sun, against the crimes of the army and the settlers….” To Zuwara, the initial nexus for cooperation has to include the questioning of the status quo. It has to involve, from the start, efforts to resist and dismantle the accepted paradigm of military occupation and settlements.

### Grassroots

#### Grassroots movements like BDS are the only solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict that higher political solutions like the Oslo Accord have failed to solve

Ziadah 14 [Rafeef Ziadah, human rights activist with the Palestinian Boycott Divestment and Sanctions National Committee and Senior Campaigns Officer at the British charity War on Want, “The case for boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel,” Al-Jazeera, August 4, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/boycott-divestmentsanctionsisraelgazahumanrights.html] JW

‘Strategic threat’ This grass-roots effort is creating an environment in which major investors and institutions feel compelled to act. In the last 12 months, a groundswell of European investors, including Dutch pension giants PGGM and ABP; Danske Bank, Denmark’s biggest bank; Norwegian bank Nordea; and state pension funds in Norway and Luxembourg have all divested from Israeli military companies, banks or companies involved in settlement construction. Even the EU and its member states have taken measures to limit government and private-sector relations with Israeli settlements. While each of these individual successes could be described as modest on their own, taken together, they represent a significant erosion of the international support upon which continued Israeli impunity depends. They could even become the springboard to a decisive international isolation of Israel, as the South African BDS movement was in the 1980s. Only too aware of this fact, Israeli leaders have described BDS as a strategic threat, passed a law that allows Israeli businesses to sue Israeli boycott advocates and hired staff in its ministries and embassies to counter the BDS movement. Israeli Finance Minister Yair Lapid has warned that “The status quo will hit each of us in the pocket.” The White House has warned of the “potential for Israeli isolation.” The BDS movement is showing a potential for upsetting the existing balance of forces in a way that no other strategy has been able to do since Oslo. As international solidarity gears up its campaigns, Palestinian diplomacy should align with the same strategic principles. After the failure of the Oslo peace process logic to deliver anything to Palestinians, resistance and anti-normalization must become again the touchstone of all interactions with Israel. Corporations profiting from Israel’s crimes, such as Veolia and G4S, must see their contracts annulled everywhere in the Middle East. In the absence of political solutions, the only force that can push things forward in Gaza is the power of people building grass-roots power. The latest attacks on Gaza take place with the full complicity of Western governments, which for decades have refused to penalize Israel for its blatant disregard of international law. Even in full view of the slaughter, the only Western response is empty rhetoric. This underlines the urgent need to rethink Palestinian and pro-Palestinian strategies in a way that is more constructive than the repeat scenarios of the past few decades. Unlike the endless rounds of negotiations, BDS does not rely on the delusional belief in the goodwill of Western governments and the neutrality of international institutions. As Israel’s actions continue unabated, the task of building a capacity for pressure is more urgent than ever.

### Statism

#### Pro-Palestinian emancipatory strategies disrupt the traditional notion of nationalism that justifies Israeli oppression

Gabr 14: GABR, IBRAHIM. "Orientalism, Palestinian Nationalism, and Israeli Repression." EInternational Relations. McGill University, Apr. 2014. Web. 07 Aug. 2015. <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/06/20/orientalism-palestinian-nationalism-and-israeli-repression/>. Undergraduate student in Honours Political Science and Economics at McGill University

With regards to the nature of these nationalist movements, Anderson (2006: 5-8) defines them as “imagined communities,” whereby even though most of the members of a national group will never meet each other, they nevertheless share a common history, culture, religion, and other characteristics. On the basis of this, the group is capable of developing a common identity, acting in concert so as to achieve political objectives, and of mapping its national identity onto the geographic space of a sovereign state, thus creating a nation-state. Tangibly then, the imagined community, within the context of a theoretical framework based on Orientalism, represents the attempts at resistance, against colonial oppression, made by those subject to Orientalist discourses under colonial or neo-colonial rule. The imagined community, and thus the nation, becomes the core of the resistance movement, via its presentation of a discourse that runs counter to the oppressive hegemonic one previously provided by the colonial metropolis, through its control of the colony’s educational system, financial system, and daily life writ large. With this, the imagined community underlying a nationalist movement like that of the Palestinians emerges as a necessary condition for the sovereign emancipation of a colonized polity. In layperson’s terms, the Orientalist discourses that exist prior to such a movement’s emergence brainwashes the population, and ingrains it with a metropolis-oriented identity that precludes organization, solidarity, and resistance. In contrast, when a counter-colonial movement emerges, often spurred on by a country’s public intellectuals, like Said, the nation is imbued with a new common meaning, common culture, and a more representative and realistic accounting of its collective history (Corbridge & Harriss, 2000: 38-40). This not only gives the nation’s members a sense of purpose with regards to emancipating themselves from their colonial oppressors, but also a means to an end, through the movement that is formed to achieve this independence. Applied directly to the Palestinian case, the nexus formed by nationalism and Orientalism is one which ultimately serves to demonstrate that Palestinian resistance to what has been referred to by many as Israeli oppression is premised upon a rejection of the structures of history and discourse put forth by the dominant Israelis. In this regard, Gerber (2003: 23-24) notes that all of the histories and political analyses of Israel which predominate in the West are predicated upon Orientalist-imbued historiographies. On this basis, it thus becomes clear that, because counter-Orientalist Palestinian nationalism is predicated upon a rejection of these Orientalist structures, it is imperative that the components of different forms of Zionism – Palestinian nationalism’s counter-ideology – be understood as discursive rivals to the Palestinian emancipatory project.

### Racism

#### Black-Palestinian solidarity enforces the idea that the Palestinians are trapped within the black body, a win for Palestine is a win for the black lives matter movement.

Azikiwe 13: Azikiwe, Abayomi. (Azikiwe is a graduate degrees in Political Science/Public Administration and Educational and Administrative Studies at Wayne State University) "African-American and Palestine Liberation." Workers World. Workers.org, 13 June 2015. Web. 04 Aug. 2015. <http://www.workers.org/articles/2015/06/13/african-american-and-palestine-liberation/>.

Israeli foreign policy is a by-product of the overall imperialist designs of Washington and Wall Street in the region. Not only is it necessary to maintain the settler-colonial state in Palestine as a bulwark of Pentagon and NATO military strategy, but it is also important to continue the domination of Egypt and other states in North Africa and the Middle East. Successive U.S. administrations have waged wars against the people of Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Sudan. Consequently, any notion of a lessening of support for Israel flies in the face of the annual multibillion-dollar subsidy to Tel Aviv, along with the transfer of arms and other military technology that is tested on the Palestinian people in Gaza and the other occupied territories. Efforts are underway to make the recent national elections in Israel a representation of the uncertainty of the domination by conservative forces centered around Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. Nonetheless, the uneasiness of the Obama administration about Democratic Party and U.S. policy in general toward Israel is partly to blame for the appearance of differences of approach to the Palestinian Authority and the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to a May 24 Newsweek magazine article titled “Tel Aviv Diary” written by Marc Shulman, “The one person who seems unwilling to accept the results of the election here appears to be the current occupant of the White House and other members of his administration. President Barack Obama has been exceptionally harsh in his criticism, which is starting to create a backlash among Israelis.” The question is: backlash against what? Obama has continued the same imperialist agenda throughout the region and is providing firm support to the current war against Yemen waged by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance. Public opinion in the U.S. is increasingly in favor of the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and statehood. Demonstrations during the summer of 2014 against the Israeli Defense Forces’ massive bombing and ground incursion into Gaza were the largest protests in history against these repeated genocidal acts. African Americans and U.S. foreign policy Both African-American and Palestinian peoples suffer from national oppression and efforts aimed at genocidal removal by the racist governmental structures in both states. During 2014, when the U.S. witnessed the largest Palestine solidarity demonstrations ever in response to the bombing and ground invasion of Gaza, African-American youth played a prominent role in these actions. Both Palestinians and African Americans spoke out clearly of their common struggle, from Gaza and the West Bank to Ferguson, Mo., and Baltimore. In Detroit demonstrations during “Operation Protective Edge” — in which the Israeli Defense Forces pounded Gaza and escalated repressive measures against Palestinians living in the West Bank — signs appeared demanding water for the people of both Gaza and Detroit. Weekly protests at the Detroit Water Sewerage Department known as “Freedom Fridays” during the summer of 2014 often joined rallies and marches taking place outside the Federal Courthouse in solidarity with Palestine. At this same time the Detroit bankruptcy proceedings were still being litigated in federal court. This was the most significant municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. Expressing concern about the more vocal opinion in support of Palestine among African Americans and its potential impact on electoral politics in the U.S., with a national election looming during 2016, Shulman wrote in the June 3 issue of Newsweek: “Of course, if Obama wants to have any chance of swaying Israeli opinion, he needs to decouple his view of the ‘plight’ of the Palestinians from that of African-Americans in the United States. It is true that both groups have been, and are, discriminated against, and certainly both groups have suffered. “However, the historic analogy between the two is very weak. African-Americans were taken as captives from their homes and kept as slaves until a civil war freed them. Many African-Americans endured a century or more of discrimination, even after the Civil War ended.” Weren’t the Palestinians driven from their homes by the Israeli state with the full backing of the U.S. and the imperialist nations? Both Africans in the U.S. and the Palestinians have been subjected to national oppression involving mass killings and forced removal from urban and rural areas. In a failed attempt to draw such a distinction between the history and conditions of Africans and Palestinians, the same author writes, “The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a traditional nationalistic conflict, with two peoples claiming the same land. This conflict would have ended long ago if Palestinians had agreed to any of the previously offered compromise solutions.” Such an argument is reminiscent of the racist newspaper editorials which blame Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Tamir Rice, Freddie Gray and others for their own deaths. Similar are those reports describing African Americans involved in militant demonstrations against police terrorism and judicial impunity as “thugs” for engaging in the destruction of property and self-defense tactics against law-enforcement agencies. These victims of settler colonialism and institutional racism are somehow expected to acquiesce to oppression in favor of the continuation and worsening of their social plight. There is a firm political basis for the connection linking apartheid, Jim Crow and Zionism in its present and historic forms. Israel has inflicted racist treatment on the Palestinians, but also against those from Africa who have migrated to the country. In recent years, attacks against African immigrants from Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia have gotten international media attention. Netanyahu recently met with an African IDF soldier who was attacked by police for racist reasons. Yet what Netanyahu and his cohorts do not mention is that his political coalition has deliberately exploited racist attitudes and social policies toward Palestinians and Africans in order to maintain control over a settler state that is losing support even within the U.S. and of course throughout the broader international community. Both the U.S. and Israel are facing growing opposition internally and globally. These racist and nationally oppressive states can only rely on military might and the economic dominance of imperialism to provide any semblance of a secured future. Greater solidarity between Palestine and African Americans will be an important factor in the burgeoning struggle against imperialism. Whether the White House, Congress and Wall Street recognize or accept this shifting situation, it is inevitable, and will change the course of history in support of the oppressed and working people of the world.

## Inherency

#### Defining anti-Zionism as anti-Semitic chills on-campus discourse that attempts to criticize Israel or support Palestine

**Emmons 16** [Alex Emmons, Senate Responds to Trump-Inspired Anti-Semitism By Targeting Students Who Criticize Israel, The Intercept, December 2 2016]

A draft of the bill obtained by The Intercept encourages the Department of Education to use the State Department’s broad, widely criticized definition of anti-Semitism when investigating schools. That definition, from a 2010 memo, includes as examples of anti-Semitism “delegitimizing” Israel, “demonizing” Israel, “applying double standards” to Israel, and “focusing on Israel only for peace or human rights investigations.” Critics have pointed out that those are political — not racist — positions, shared by a significant number of Jews, and qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment of the Constitution. According to the draft, the bill does not adopt the definition as a formal legal standard, it only directs the State Department to “take into consideration” the definition when investigating schools for anti-Semitic discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The memo’s definition — which is widely supported by Israeli advocacy groups — was intended for identifying anti-Semitic groups overseas. Even then, it came with caveats. Criticisms of Israel are only examples of possible anti-Semitism “taking into account the overall context,” and the memo concludes: “However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as anti-Semitic.” Attempts to adopt the definition as a standard for campus censorship have drawn criticism from civil rights groups, free speech advocates, newspapers, hundreds of academics, and even one of the definition’s crafters, who wrote a column last year arguing it should not be applied to campuses. The bill approved by the Senate on Thursday was supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Jewish Federations of North America, and the Anti-Defamation League. “The definition will have a severe chilling effect on campuses, and that is the explicit goal of the Israel advocacy organizations who promote it,” said Liz Jackson, an attorney with the group Palestine Legal. “Student activists for Palestinian rights already operate in a repressive environment. If this bill passes, they will face the specter of federal investigation simply for engaging in criticism of the Israeli government’s abusive policies.” Campus activists are being subject to an increasingly broad censorship effort by Israeli-allied groups. Each year, Palestine Legal documents hundreds of instances of obstruction, censorship, or punishment of pro-Palestinian activism at colleges and universities. In December 2015, for example, one student at George Washington University was ordered by campus police to remove a Palestinian flag from her window, and threatened with further disciplinary action. At other campuses, students have been suspended or threatened with expulsion for demonstrating against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. The University of Illinois in 2014 fired a tenure-track professor for tweeting about Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. Filing complaints with the Department of Education has been a favored tactic of groups including the Zionist Organization of America and the Brandeis Center, which have written letters to the department alleging that events like demonstrations and film screenings amount to “harassment” or “intimidation,” and create a “hostile environment on the basis of national origin” for Jewish students on campus.

#### Public universities are threatening cuts to funding in response to pro-Palestine divestment strategies. Empirically proven on University of California campuses where organizations that don’t associate with pro-Palestine get funding while others don’t

Friedman 15 [Nora Barrows-Friedman, staff writer and associate editor at The Electronic Intifada, “UCLA student groups face funding cuts over Israel divestment,” The Electronic Intifada, Dec 7, 2015, https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/nora-barrows-friedman/ucla-student-groups-face-funding-cuts-over-israel-divestment] JW

The Graduate Students Association at UCLA in California has put stipulations on funding for student groups based on affiliation with Palestinian rights activism. Students and civil rights organizations are concerned that such conditions are the result of overt willingness by University of California’s top officials to exceptionalize free speech rights and threaten punishment against student activists. In mid-October, the president of UCLA’s Graduate Students Association sent an email to a student group that was seeking funding for a diversity caucus event. The association represents thousands of UCLA’s graduate students and provides resources, including funding, to graduate students and organizations. Members pay mandatory fees each academic quarter. The association’s president informed the group that “GSA leadership has a zero engagement/endorsement policy towards Divest from Israel or any related movement/organization” (emphasis in original) and awarded the group $2,000 in funding based on their “zero connection” to a “Divest from Israel” group. UCLA does not have an organization or movement specifically called “Divest from Israel,” but the president was most likely referring to the graduate student workers’ union across the University of California system, UAW Local 2865, which passed a historic divestment resolution one year ago. This condition could also apply to Students for Justice in Palestine as well as graduate student organizations that support the Palestinian-led boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement. In addition to UAW 2865’s successful divestment vote, student governments at seven out of nine University of California undergraduate campuses — including at UCLA in 2014 — have passed resolutions calling for the administration to pull investments from US and international companies profiting from Israel’s violations of Palestinians’ rights. Despite an expensive public relations campaign waged by anti-Palestinian groups, UCLA’s divestment resolution passed by a landslide vote and was supported by more than 30 student organizations.

## Additional Solvency

### Divestment

#### Two impacts:

#### a) Clubs on college campuses can help create civic engagement for their students.

Cress et al 10 [Christine M. Cress, PhD, is department chair of educational leadership and policy and professor of postsecondary, adult, and continuing education (PACE) at Portland State University in Portland, Oregon, “A Processing Connection: Increasing College Access and Success through Civic Engagement,” 2010, http://www.compact.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/A-Promising-Connection.pdf] JW

Both historical and contemporary **higher education writers** and researchers **have asserted that the primary goal of higher education is to develop civic-minded citizens** with the skills and capacities to lead our communities and nation (e.g., Dewey, 1916; Bowen, 1977; Astin, 1996; Eyler & Giles, 1999; Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont, & Stephens, 2003; Hurtado, Engberg, & Ponjuan, 2003). Although definitions of civic engagement within higher education vary by institution, program, and individual, there is no doubt that **leveraging civic engagement for the mutual benefit of colleges and communities can be an effective strategy for realizing educational, civic, and economic outcomes**. **Campuses have used a variety of terms to describe their civic engagement activitie**s and the ways these activities link to learning. Some of the most widely used are **service-learning, community engagement, community-based research**, civic education, community experiences, community-based learning**, democratic practice, and philanthropy education**, not to mention a variety of co-curricular offerings for students. Regardless of the term used, if part of the purpose of the activity is **to educate or enhance students’ understanding of civic life**, the work generally can be referred to as civic engagement. The idea that higher education institutions are responsible for nurturing the growth and development of citizenship skills is not new. **Historically, many colleges were founded on the principle of facilitating civic leadership knowledge and skills** (Rudolph, 1990). The system of community colleges grew out of a commitment to the democratic principles of access and opportunity (Cohen & Brawer, 2003); its leaders were philosophically dedicated to the belief that broad engagement of the diverse community will create a strong educational, social, political, and economic fabric.

#### b) Israeli companies abuse West Bank occupation for their own profit while exploiting and suppressing local Palestinians. Every dollar that the divestment strategy gains translates into increased welfare in Palestine

Press 16 [Eyal Press, author of “Beautiful Souls: The Courage and Conscience of Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times, “When ‘Made in Israel’ Is a Human Rights Abuse,” New York Times, January 26, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/opinion/when-made-in-israel-is-a-human-rights-abuse.html?\_r=0] JW

From a biblical perspective, this view may be tenable. From a legal and moral perspective, it is not. As documented in a new report by Human Rights Watch, Israel’s occupation has grown into a lucrative business, exploited by companies as part of a system that is unlawful and abusive. Like the settlers, these enterprises receive benefits from the Israeli government — preferential access to land and water, low rents — that make the occupied territories an alluring destination. It is another story for Palestinians, who are routinely denied permits to open their own businesses, cut off from their land and hemmed in by restrictions that, according to the World Bank, cost the Palestinian economy $3.4 billion a year. All of these businesses are operating on illegally occupied land. A significant amount of land, it turns out. There are roughly 1,000 factories in the chain of Israeli-administered “industrial zones” strung across the West Bank. The geographic footprint of these commercial enterprises, together with shopping centers and agricultural projects, exceeds the built-up areas of settler housing. Continue reading the main story Some Israeli officials have argued that Palestinians benefit by working in settlement businesses, producing what one factory owner calls “goods of peace.” But many work in settlements only because Israel’s stifling of the Palestinian economy has deprived them of alternatives. Because the government rarely conducts labor inspections, Palestinian workers often earn less than the Israeli minimum wage. If workers complain, employers sometimes retaliate by fabricating a “security incident” that will deprive Palestinians of their work permits, according to the H.R.W. report. To view goods made under these conditions as no different than products made within Israel requires going blind to such indignities. Unfortunately, that is exactly what new legislation that will soon land on President Obama’s desk would require the United States government to do. Under a provision of a larger piece of legislation, popularly known as the Customs Bill, that has been approved by the House and is expected to soon pass the Senate, American officials will be obligated to treat the settlements as part of Israel in future trade negotiations.

## Case Extensions

### Case Extension Devansh

The case outweighs extend Barma Mills and Sunstein the role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who best provides a concrete policy action to combat material oppression and the plan text that public colleges shouldn’t restrict speech that criticizes any of Israel’s actions which currently occurs by conflating anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism and other forms of systemic obstruction against Palestinian activism that’s Volokh and PL. The aff is a good idea: it combats Islamophobia by getting rid of the association of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism which usually leads to pro-Israel campaigns that marginalize Muslim students **and it combats anti-Semitism** by giving Palestinian students unity and relief in their movement and allowing criticism against far-right Israeli structures like Hillel International which seeks to purge any Jewish anti-Zionists that don’t have a secure pro-Israel stance. The second advantage completely outweighs on scope and magnitude because it causes **spillover** to other movements and provides relief to Palestinians oppressed in the West Bank through BDS

### Solvency Politics

#### AT K

The case resolves material violence and is a good idea. Friedman 15 indicates that students take an active role in civic engagement and standing up to material oppression on a global scale but also shows that universities are suppressing them right now.

### Solvency Culture

#### V K

Case resolves material violence and is a good idea. Thesis of the 1AC is that allowing criticism of Israel shifts away from a culture that glorifies and hides any oppressive actions towards Palestinians and leads to everyday violence against minority groups on campus.

Also proves the aff is key to alt solvency

1. you can’t enact the alternative if you are being ignored and vandalized or unjustly quarantined by a regime
2. The case spills over to other reform movements which can solve your problems progressively in the long run. We outweigh on time frame and scope

### Framing

#### AT K

Extend Barma 16, the ROB is to find the policy option to reduce material oppression. This de-links their K offense which only cares about <insert k impact here>.

The aff is key to solidarity with Palestinian movements. Palestinian students in the squo are excluded from college conversations. We control the internal link to safe spaces because there is none in the squo for Palestinians. The aff is key to their support which uniquely justifies the perm because the aff is a good idea.

Links to the kritik do not preclude the aff uniquely justifies the permutation affirming is key to solidarity with Palestinians even if the aff is under the scope of a bad structure that doesn’t mean the aff is a bad idea you have a chance to do something good if you vote affirmative. Both your movement and our affirmative can work together also the aff spills over to your movement

### Additional Solvency Cards

#### READ THIS IN THE 1AR IF THEY READ INHERENCY PRESSES

**Robbins 16** [Annie Robbins, Editor at Large for Mondoweiss, “New anti-Semitism legislation may stifle campus activism for Palestinian rights,” December 1, 2016, http://mondoweiss.net/2016/12/legislation-rights/]

Increasingly, students on American campuses perceive advocating for justice in Palestine as a moral imperative. The steady growth of the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement for Palestinian freedom has been met by a wave legislation aimed at punishing or suppressing our 1st amendment rights to free speech and silencing student activism. The latest of these bills is the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act, introduced yesterday by U.S. Senators Bob Casey (D-PA) and Tim Scott (R-SC), which redefines anti-Semitism tbo include criticism of Israel. Ostensibly, according to Senators Casey and Scott, the purpose of the legislation is to  “ensure the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) has the necessary statutory tools at their disposal to investigate anti-Jewish incidents”, implying previous investigations by the DOE, which failed to substantiate accusations of anti-Semitism, lacked sufficient tools to criminalize activism critical of Israel on campus.

Jewish Voice for Peace says the bill would “codify a controversial State Department definition of anti-Semitism that broadly defines criticism of the state of Israel as anti-Semitic.” And Kenneth Stern, the American Jewish Committee’s specialist on anti-Semitism and one of the drafters of the State Department’s definition of anti-Semitism, thinks “official adoption of the State Department’s definition would do more harm than good.” He doesn’t think the definition should be used as a speech code for university students and rejected that proposal in an op-ed in the Jewish Journal last year:

## AT Case Turns

### AT Marketplace of Ideas Top Level

1. These turns miss the boat- It is about ending the silencing of criticism of Israeli policies, which screws over Palestinians. We aren’t exchanging ideas or anything, just simply allowing for such speech to be conducted.
2. Even if no one becomes anti-Zionist advocates, the plan spills over to other reform movements and allows us to become critically engaged in trying to find solutions to these problems

### AT Polarization Theory

1. might be true in abstract but not in educational spaces- students come to college specifically to learn so they will be willing to modify their ideas.

### AT Gov controls speech

1. Vietnam war and empirics deny, these students aren’t arrested or stopped by the government. Giving students a voice contributes independently
2. Impact turn- causes a fight back, angry at government interference.

### AT Socialized Against Dissent

1. not in the context of anti-Zionism - it isn’t a view only held by a small minority so they won’t focus just on delivery, it is mainstream enough.

### AT Truth doesn’t reign out

1. try or die- anti-Zionism is silenced right now, it can only get better by letting them talk about it

## Niemi Extension

#### [Niemi] Semantic considerations are racist because they deem certain dialogues as correct and exclude all others. Thus other races with other dialogues are told to get out of debate. Niemi[[1]](#footnote-1)

Though I believe Mr. Nebel to be fundamentally wrong on the debate theoretical level, I have a more serious objection. I will make this claim in the strongest terms I possibly can. **Correctness is racism.** **Correctness is “you must be either a boy or a girl or you are wrong.”** Correctness is “the ideal functioning body versus all others.” Correctness is one kind of person having access to The Truth and others lacking it. **Correctness is “sit down and shut up.” Correctness is “your kind aren’t welcome here.”**

**Any debater who runs so called “Nebel T” and any judge who votes for this argument must acknowledge that they** are situationally and **strategically embrac[e] a perspective from which there is a**n implicit or explicit **metric of what it means to be a competent english speaker.** What is **the logical conclusion** of speaking competent english? The notion that “mongrel” forms of english are inferior, diminished, unpersuasive, and should not have access to the ballot. Quite possibly **[is] the notion that those who can’t live up to these standards should not be involved in debate.** After all, **their dialects are not what resolutions are written in** – it is people like Mr. Nebel whose dialect prescribes correct resolutional meaning.

You may say that “competent speakers” was a rhetorical flourish, I am nitpicking, and that Mr. Nebel should certainly be allowed to take back his offensive speech. I will say this: **the competent english speaker**, aka the correct type of thinking and being, **is the fundamental goal and top-level value** that Mr. Nebel appeals to **throughout his articles**. If this is “not what he meant” then he did not mean that debaters should pay any attention to nor follow his logic. **Either he defends correctness or he concedes the irrelevance and negative impacts to fairness and education of his position.**

**Nebel may appeal to pragmatics** as a way out of the appeal to correctness, **but** in fact, **his pragmatic claims are a pragmatic justification for correctness.** This concedes pragmatics first anyway, and that so to speak, is a flow I can win on. It is my opinion that **there is no in or out of round benefit that correctness could provide sufficient to outweigh the toxicity of its implementation and rhetorical methodology.**

This is a voting issue regardless of the flow, this is a teachable moment.

Vincent 13, Chris, Re-Conceptualizing our Performances: Accountability in Lincoln Douglas Debate, Vbriefly, 2013.

The question then becomes how does our discourse justify what we believe? For many debaters it is the gaming aspect of debate that allows us to assume that our speech can be disconnected from the speech act. The speech can be defined as the arguments that are placed on the flow, and is evaluated in the context of what is the most logical and rational argument to win the round. The critical distinction is the speech act, which is the performance of that discourse. It’s not what you say, but what you justify. Understanding the speech act requires critically assessing the ramifications of the debaters discourse. Debate is in and of itself a performance. To claim that it is not is to be divorced from the reality of what we do. We must evaluate what a debaters performance does and justifies. For white debaters it is easy to view the discourse as detached from the body. For those with privilege in debate, they are never forced to have their performance attached to them but instead their arguments are viewed as words on paper. They are taught to separate themselves from any ideologies and beliefs, and feel that there is no consequence to what they say. It becomes the way in which they justify what is deemed as “rational” and “logical” thought. The argument sounds like it will be competitive so it is read but it is deemed as just an argument. Judges evaluate this as just a speech. This becomes what I deem as a performance by the body, rather than a performance of the body. Performances by the body allow debaters to not be held accountable to the words they say. Words are seen as divorced from any meaning outside of the flow, versus the performance of the body where the words are attached to the body itself. Debaters often insert the performance by the body, when they make arguments that they claim that they do not believe, but think it is the best strategy for the round. This is a false assumption, since for black debaters meaning is always connected to their bodies. The best strategy should never be one that at the same time justifies acts of racism. Charles Mills argues that “the moral concerns of African Americans have centered on the assertion of their personhood, a personhood that could generally be taken for granted by whites, so that blacks have had to see these theories from a location outside their purview.” For example, I witnessed a round at a tournament this season where a debater ran a utilitarianism disadvantage. His opponent argued that this discourse was racist because it ignores the way in which a utilitarian calculus has distorted communities of color by ignoring the wars and violence already occurring in those communities. In the next speech, the debater stood up, conceded it was racist, and argued that it was the reason he was not going for it and moved on, and still won the debate. This is problematic because it demonstrates exactly what Mill’s argument is. For the black debater this argument is a question of his or her personhood within the debate space and the white debater was not held accountable for the words that are said. Again for debaters of color, their performance is always attached to their body which is why it is important that the performance be viewed in relation to the speech act. Whites are allowed to take for granted the impact their words have on the bodies in the space. They take for granted this notion of personhood and ignore the concerns of those who do not matter divorced from the flow. It is never a question of “should we make arguments divorced from our ideologies,” it is a question of is it even possible. It is my argument that our performances, regardless of what justification we provide, are always a reflection of the ideologies we hold. Why should a black debater have to use a utilitarian calculus just to win a round, when that same discourse justifies violence in the community they go back home to? Our performances and our decisions in the round, reflect the beliefs that we hold when we go back to our communities. As a community we must re-conceptualize this distinction the performance by the body and of the body by re-evaluating the role of the speech and the speech act. It is no longer enough for judges to vote off of the flow anymore. Students of color are being held to a higher threshold to better articulate why racism is bad, which is the problem in a space that we deem to be educational. It is here where I shift my focus to a solution. Debaters must be held accountable for the words they say in the round. We should no longer evaluate the speech. Instead we must begin to evaluate the speech act itself. Debaters must be held accountable for more than winning the debate. They must be held accountable for the implications of that speech. As educators and adjudicators in the debate space we also have an ethical obligation to foster an atmosphere of education. It is not enough for judges to offer predispositions suggesting that they do not endorse racist, sexist, homophobic discourse, or justify why they do not hold that belief, and still offer a rational reason why they voted for it. Judges have become complacent in voting on the discourse, if the other debater does not provide a clear enough role of the ballot framing, or does not articulate well enough why the racist discourse should be rejected. Judges must be willing to foster a learning atmosphere by holding debaters accountable for what they say in the round. They must be willing to vote against a debater if they endorse racist discourse. They must be willing to disrupt the process of the flow for the purpose of embracing that teachable moment. The speech must be connected to the speech act. We must view the entire debate as a performance of the body, instead of the argument solely on the flow. Likewise, judges must be held accountable for what they vote for in the debate space. If a judge is comfortable enough to vote for discourse that is racist, sexist, or homophobic, they must also be prepared to defend their actions. We as a community do not live in a vacuum and do not live isolated from the larger society. That means that judges must defend their actions to the debaters, their coaches, and to the other judges in the room if it is a panel. Students of color should not have the burden of articulating why racist discourse must be rejected, but should have the assurance that the educator with the ballot will protect them in those moments. Until we re-conceptualize the speech and the speech act, and until judges are comfortable enough to vote down debaters for a performance that perpetuates violence in the debate space, debaters and coaches alike will remain complacent in their privilege. As educators we must begin to shift the paradigm and be comfortable doing this. As a community we should stop looking at ourselves as isolated in a vacuum and recognize that the discourse and knowledge we produce in debate has real implications for how we think when we leave this space. Our performances must be viewed as of the body instead of just by it. As long as we continue to operate in a world where our performances are merely by bodies, we will continue to foster a climate of hostility and violence towards students of color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could have.

Outweighs fiat is illusory- the representations that we endorse in round have actual effects on the real world.

# Frontlines- DA

## AT SJP DA

### Reps K (Finish)

http://www.timesofisrael.com/brandeis-whistleblower-stirs-up-new-hornets-nest/

#### First, representations of our language affect our ability to act effectively and interact with others. Haste 98:

Helen Haste, [PhD of Psychology at the University of Bath], “Communitarianism and the Social Construction of Morality”, 1998. NC

Communitarian thinkersstart from a very different psychological tradition. They emphasise theprimacy of language and social interaction in the generation of meaning [is important]. Taylor argues that human life is ‘fundamentally dialogic …. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression**.**’ (1991 p 32). This aligns the communitarian ontological position with social constructionists like John Shotter (1993) and Rom HarrZ (HarrZ and Gillett, 1994) who argue that the primary human reality is face-to-face conversation. If social interaction is the crucible of meaning, then the child learns about morality through discourse and through social practices, both explicit and implicit. The ‘meaning’ of something – including the meaning of our own identity and our morality – depends on what is comprehensible and recognized within our social community. Social beings create their identity through shared discourse and language(Shotter, 1993). Communities are multiple; we are members of many communities which each offer us identity, and personal meaning, and within each different elements and skills are salient. Cultural narratives, stories and traditions feed directly into our identity, signaling valued attributes and behaviours, and giving an explanation for our past and present. Crucially, we also recognize that these are shared by those whom we thus define as members of our community. A moral obligation can only have meaning within a social context. Richard Shweder describes taboos and practices found amongst rural Hindus in India which are quite morally meaningless to Americans, because they are associated with beliefs about pollution which are not shared (Shweder et al, 1987). However practices may be widely condemned, but for different reasons – believing that rape is wrong because it defiles the victim’s purity, is very different from seeing it as wrong because treats her as an object rather than a person.

### 

## AT Divestment DA

1. non unique: tons of other organizations have divested from Israel like corporations and private universities

2. Poverty in Palestine is non-unique: they’re paid below minimum wage and can be fired for arbitrary reasons

3. Wars starting from divestment is empirically denied: it’s been done before and Israel didn’t go nuts

4. Link turn: taking out Israel’s financial resources decreases it’s ability to wage wars

5. Extend the Press 16 evidence which is a link turn to the DA: the only reason Palestinians are reliant on Israel is because only Israeli businesses are allowed in and Palestinian ones are crowded out. The aff creates pressure to change that policy

## AT Zionism DA

1. uniqueness overwhelms the link: tons of other people criticize Israel besides college students such as politicians and activists. If more college students openly speaking against Israel were sufficient to collapse it, then Israel should have fallen already

2. non-unique: anti-Israel speech and protests happen regardless of the implementation of the aff

3. Link turn: continued suppression of Palestinian activism breeds resentment within pro-Palestine activists which triggers anti-Semitic activity. The only solution to on campus anti-Semitism is to end the censorship arms race

4. No link: just because it’s a good idea to support Israel unconditionally does not mean that we should support it uncritically.

5. Link turn: Israel receives extreme international pressure for its refusal to listen to the international community which means accepting criticism would cast Zionism in a better light

### A2 Refugee Problem caused by 1948 Arab war against Israel

#### Zionist forces also expelled civilians and tried getting rid of the Arab population and had no right to claim that land

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There are two principle fallacies in this argument: One, it was not simply that Palestinians fled war. Many did flee, but this was encouraged by the Zionist forces, which also directly expelled many civilians from their homes and destroyed their villages so they could never return. It was the *intent* of the Zionists to ethnically cleanse Palestine of most of its Arab population in order for the demographically “Jewish state” of Israel to be established. Indeed, cleansing Palestine of Arabs was a prerequisite for this state to be created. This is why Israel refused to allow *those* refugees to return. Two, this argument assumes that the Zionists’ unilateral declaration of the existence of Israel on May 14, 1948, was legitimate. *It wasn’t*. The Zionists had neither any legal nor moral authority to declare sovereignty over a land in which they were a minority and of which they owned only about 7 percent. While they cited UN Resolution 181 (the “partition plan” resolution) as granting such authority, in fact, this resolution neither partitioned Palestine *nor* [never]conferred *any legal* authority to the Zionists for their *unilateral* declaration.

### A2 Israel has a Right to Exist

#### No state has a right to exist – rather there is a right to self-determination which Israel has denied Palestinians. You are legitimizing the way Israel got rid of Palestinians.

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No state has a “right to exist”. This concept is a propaganda device invented by the US and Israel for a reason that will become clear momentarily. One might be tempted to answer this argument with: “Well, Palestine has a right to exist, too!” But this is not the proper response! Political entities defined by lines on maps do not have rights, individuals do. The proper framework for discussion is the right to self-determination. And it is manifestly Israelthat has denied that right to the Palestinianssince its founding (and indeed, by the Zionists even before Israel’s founding), and not vice versa. The necessity of redefining the framework for discussion thus becomes obvious. To say that Israel has a “right to exist” is effectively to assert that the Zionists’ unilateral declaration of Israel’s existence and the ethnic cleansing by which Israel *actually* came into being were legitimate. Needless to say, these were not legitimate actions on the part of the Zionists.

### A2 Israel Self defense by attacking Egypt

#### Israel acted without a justification for war – there were peaceful means they could have taken. Israel was under no threat from Egypt

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Israel’s attack on Egypt on the morning of June 5, 1967 — the event that started the “Six Day War” — was not preemptive. Zionists will argue that Nasser’s threats, Egypt’s closing of the Straits of Tiran and Suez Canal to Israeli shipping, its movement of troops into the Sinai Peninsula, and its expelling of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) all essentially amounted to acts of war. However, none of these actions constituted aggression under international law. Egypt’s perspective was that the straits and Suez Canal were its territorial waterways so it had a right to deny passage to an enemy state that had already attacked it once, in 1956 (when Israel conspired with Britain and France to launch a war of aggression against Egypt). While legal scholars may debate the legitimacy of that point of view, the fact is that Israel had peaceful means available to it to seek redress for this grievance against Egypt. It did not, under international law, constitute a *casus belli*(justification for war). Nasser wanted the UN peacekeeping force gone because he was being accused by Syria and Jordan of hiding behind it. His bellicose rhetoric was about saving face but was just that: *rhetoric*. The proposal was made to restation UNEF on Israel’s side of the border, but, instructively, *Israel rejected this proposal*. Furthermore, the CIA observed that Egypt’s troops took up defensive positions in the Sinai, and Israel’s own intelligence assessed *that* Israel was under no threat of attack *from Egypt*. In 1982, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledged, “In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.” Under international law, Israel’s attack on Egypt constituted aggression, defined at Nuremberg as “the supreme international crime”.

### A2 UN 242 -> Not Full Withdrawal

**Upon close analysis, this was never the conclusion. The UN CLEARLY says that Israel has to return to its old lines**

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This is a *lie*. Unfortunately, it is very effective Zionist hasbara and is widely believed even by supporters of Palestinians’ rights. There are three main components of the Zionist argument: 1. The absence of the article “the” before the words “territories occupied” in sub-paragraph (i) of the first operative paragraph of this Security Council resolution means only a partial withdrawal was required. 2. Sub-paragraph (ii) requires that “secure and recognized borders” be established before Israel is required to withdraw. 3. Officials responsible for creating and passing Resolution 242, like Lord Caradon (UK) and Arthur Goldberg (US) have said it did not require a full withdrawal. Briefly, here are the flaws in these arguments: First of all, this is nonsense even on its face: the resolution does not say Israel must withdraw from “*the*territories occupied” so we must understand it to mean Israel must withdraw from only “*some*territories occupied”? This self-defeating Zionist logic is prima facie nonsense. In truth, the absence of the article has no effect on the meaning of the resolution inasmuch as the *extent*of withdraw is concerned. It calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces “from territories occupied”, plural. The Syrian Golan Heights, the Egyptian Sinai, and the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and West Bank are all “territories occupied” during the 1967 war and thus territories from which Israel was required to withdraw under the clear and unambiguous wording of Resolution 242. In fact, the preambulatory section of the resolution emphasized the principle of international law that the acquisition of territory by war is inadmissible — and it is in the context of that emphasized principle that the resolution’s call for Israeli withdrawal must be understood. As for sub-paragraph (ii), while it does call for the establishment of “secure and recognized borders”, it does not establish this*as a precondition* for the withdraw of Israeli forces. It says “both” Israeli withdrawal *and*establishment of such borders are required, *conditioning neither one upon the other*. It was not the Security Council’s intent that a people whose land was occupied be required to negotiate with the occupier over where to draw the border. Zionists claim otherwise, but to do so, they quote Caradon and Goldberg from years after the resolution’s passage. But, first, UN resolutions are not open to unilateral interpretation, but must be understand according to the will of the Security Council as a whole; and, second, the relevant documentary record for understanding the will of the Council is from prior to and up until the resolution’s adoption. And turning to that documentary record, it is absolutely clear that the Security Council was explicit and unanimous that Resolution 242 required Israel to return to the lines it held prior to June 5, 1967.

### A2 Palestine Rejected Israeli Offers

Fact check - every single concession was demanded, Israeli didn’t offer anything.

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This argument assumes that Israel accepts the two-state solution and had made generous concessions in each of those “offers”, such as that made at Camp David in 2000. Those assumptions are *absolutely false*. In fact, every single concession made during each of the “offers” in question — throughout the entire so-called “peace process” — was demanded or made by the Palestinians. This Zionist hasbara, frequently propagated by US government officials and media commentators, simply frames the discussion in terms of what Israel wants rather than what it has a right to under international law. Zionists say things like, “Israel offered the Palestinians a state in 95 percent of the West Bank at Camp David”. First of all, this is false. Israel started out demanding to annex 12 percent of the West Bank, and by the end of the talks was still demanding 9 percent. Second, none of this land was Israel’s to give. Under international law, every inch of it is recognized as “occupied Palestinian territory”. So translated into meaningful terms, we see arguments like the above equate that Israel “offered” to take only 5 percent (really 9 percent) of the Palestinians’ land. Furthermore, these demands to annex Palestinian territory were accompanied with other unreasonable demands, such as dividing the West Bank into Bantustan-like enclaves with Jewish-only highways connecting illegally constructed Israeli settlements and Israeli military control over Palestine’s borders and airspace. In other words, Israel demanded that the Palestinians surrender more of their land, rights, and sovereignty. If a thief steals a $100 from you and then says he will give you back $91 if you agree to certain other demands requiring you to surrender your rights, would you describe it as a “generous offer” or a “concession”? The truth is that while the Palestinian leadership has accepted the two-state solution since the late 1980s, Israel has always rejected it. In fact, the US-led so-called “peace process” is in reality *the process by which Israel and its superpower benefactor have long****blocked****implementation of the two-state solution.*

### A2 UN -> Israeli Gaza Blockade Legal

#### Turn – the UN has reaffirmed the illegality of their blockade a multitude of times – their evidence is a misconstrued representation of international law and the argument is fallacious

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Actually, the UN has repeatedly affirmed the illegality of Israel’s blockade, which amounts to a policy of collective punishment in violation of international law. This criminal policy has been condemned by numerous UN bodies; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and numerous international human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the Israeli rights groups B’Tselem and Gisha. This blockade continues in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1860, which called on Israel to end it. So what are Zionists talking about when they claim the UN has said Israel’s blockade is legal? They are talking about a report commissioned by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon known as the “Palmer Report”. It’s true that this report expressed the opinion of its two chairmembers that Israel’s naval blockade was legal. But what Zionists don’t tell you is that they also noted in their report itself *that* this conclusion *of theirs* went beyond their mandateand *that they had no authority to offer their legal opinion*. Furthermore, the arguments they employed to arrive at their conclusion were riddled with factual and logical errors. Essentially, they employed circular reasoning by adopting the conclusion as their premise: in short, they argued that the naval blockade was legal because it was not a policy of collective punishment. In fact, they went to great lengths to *avoid*inquiring whether the blockade constituted collective punishment under international law, and they resorted to demonstrable misrepresentations of what international law actually has to say in an effort to sustain their expressed opinion. So why would they do that? Well, they stated the reason in their report: their mandate was *not*to inquire into the legality of the blockade, but the *political* objective of allowing Israel and Turkey to put the *Mavi Marmara* incident behind them. That was the incident in May 2010 in which Israeli forces attacked the humanitarian “Freedom Flotilla” — which was seeking to break Israel’s illegal blockade and draw the world’s attention to it — in international waters and murdered nine Turkish activists on board.

### A2 Operation Cast Lead launched after rockets from Gaza

#### This is deceit by omission– Israel repeatedly violated a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel

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This Zionist hasbara — frequently parroted by the US government and mainstream media — is deceit by omission. It’s true that in the years prior to Israel’s 2008-09 “Operation Cast Lead” thousands of rockets were fired at Israel from Gaza — and indiscriminate rocket attacks on Israeli population centers are certainly war crimes. However, what the Zionists don’t tell you is that on June 19, Israel and Hamas entered into a ceasefire agreement that was repeatedly violated *not* by *Hamas, but*Israel. The *New York Times*actually reported on the most serious of those Israeli violations on the day it occurred (November 4, 2008), but thereafter tossed this fact down the memory hole. Subsequently, when it referred to the ceasefire, it merely said that it “broke down” without stating the reason why: *because it was violated by Israel*. More frequently, that there had even been a ceasefire — much less that it was not Hamas but Israel who violated it — was completely omitted, replaced by a false narrative in which Israel was acting in self defense against Hamas rocket attacks. As illustrated by Operation Cast Lead, it is a modus operandi of Israel’s to take actions to attempt to provoke a violent response from Palestinian militants in order to create pretexts for its own resorts to its own violence, which occurs on an incomparably greater scale.

### A2 Hamas Human Shields -> Civilians Killed

#### False -- Israel deliberately killed civilians and actually used Palestinians as human shields during Operation Cast Lead

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This is a lie. The truth is that Israel engaged in deliberately disproportionate use of force during its 2008-09 (Operation Cast Lead), 2012 (Operation Pillar of Defense), and 2014 (Operation Protective Edge) assaults on Gaza. In fact, it openly declared its intention to commit what amount to war crimes with its so-called “Dahiya Doctrine” — a reference to the flattening of the Dahiya district of Beirut in 2006 to punish the civilian population. To take the example of Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s war crimes are well documented and incontrovertible. It deliberately targeted the civilian infrastructure for destruction as part of a policy of punishing the people of Gaza, and the IDF routinely used indiscriminate force, such as attacks on UN schools being used as shelters, hospitals, and residential homes. In fact, there is not a single documented case of a Palestinian civilian killed during Operation Cast Lead who was being used by Hamas at the time as a human shield. This might seem like a shocking truth, given the US mainstream media’s mindless repetition of the IDF’s own propaganda about civilians dying only because Hamas was using them as human shields, but this operation has been extensively investigated by human rights organizations and the UN, all of which investigations have concluded that there is no evidence to support Israel’s claimed justifications for killing civilians. On the other hand, these investigations did conclude that Israeli forces used Palestinian civilians as human shields during Operation Cast Lead, such as forcing children to walk in front of them as they cleared homes.

## AT Anti-Semitism DA

1. Link turn:

2. Link turn: suppressing the free speech of hateful organizations allow themselves to cast themselves as victims, drowns out their hateful views, and ultimately hurts pro-Israel groups

Mosaic 16 [Mosaic Magazine, takes a lively, serious, and committed approach to Jewish issues and ideas, “A Way to Deal with Campus Anti-Semitism without Suppressing Freedom of Speech,” September 23, 2016, <https://mosaicmagazine.com/picks/2016/09/a-way-to-deal-with-campus-anti-semitism-without-suppressing-freedom-of-speech/>] JW \*brackets and ellipsis from original text

In the wake of a series of anti-Semitic incidents—including one student protestor who yelled “Death to the Jews!” at a group of pro-Israel students—the City University of New York (CUNY) commissioned an outside investigation. The resulting report, argues K.C. Johnson, points to ways faculty and administrators can combat anti-Semitism while maintaining an uncompromising commitment to freedom of speech. It also brings to light many troubling happenings: [The report] correctly noted [that] “die-ins, mock checkpoints, and the SJP [Students for Justice in Palestine] banner may offend some, but the First Amendment does not permit a public university to take action against them.” . . . Quite apart from any constitutional problems, attempts to suppress student speech make no tactical sense for pro-Israel advocates. College authority to channel the speech of student organizations inevitably would be used to harm pro-Israel student groups, which on most campuses enjoy scant faculty support. Moreover, limiting the rights of anti-Israel activists allows them to shift the discussion away from their extreme beliefs, from which most people outside academia appropriately recoil, to a different debate about protecting student civil liberties for all, [thus] doing SJP’s work for the organization by allowing [its] activists to position themselves as victims. Seeking to undermine free speech, moreover, distracts from previously unrevealed, deeply disturbing findings from the CUNY report. At Brooklyn College, for instance, an English professor “called Israelis assassins and baby killers.” A history professor, teaching a general-education course on Western civilization, skipped the Holocaust, informing the class that “you all know this story.” Another professor used class time to discuss negotiations of the new faculty contract, and remained silent as a student claimed that “the administration was run by Zionists.” . . . Faculty control over what occurs in the classroom is near-sacrosanct. But professors shouldn’t be skipping the Holocaust in Western-civilization surveys or replacing course content with discussions about the faculty contract—much less standing idly by as a student hijacks the (already inappropriate) subject matter to launch an attack on “Zionists.” . . . Most CUNY students are on campus to learn and therefore are badly served when professors . . . abuse their authority in the classroom. The report also provides a needed reminder that administrators should exercise their own free-speech rights when they encounter anti-Semitic conduct among their student body. . . . Given the imbalanced campus environment on matters related to Israel, administrators also need to be more proactive. Faculty—especially untenured faculty—who invite pro-Israel speakers must be protected from retaliation . . . and campuses should adopt the University of Chicago’s free-speech principles as an affirmation that despite the generally unfavorable climate, pro-Israel speech by students will be welcomed.

3. Speech against Israel DOES NOT justify anti-Semitism and conflating speech against Israel with that chills constructive discourse that is key to resolving long term anti-Semitism

Butler 03 [Judith Butler, Maxine Elliot Professor of Comparative Literature and Critical Theory at Berkeley, “No, it’s not anti-semitic,” London Review of Books Vol. 25 No. 16 - 21 August 2003 pages 19-21] JW

Summers is right to voice concern about rising anti-semitism, and every progressive person ought to challenge anti-semitism vigorously wherever it occurs. It seems, though, that historically we have now reached a position in which Jews cannot legitimately be understood always and only as presumptive victims. Sometimes we surely are, but sometimes we surely are not. No political ethics can start from the assumption that Jews monopolise the position of victim. ‘Victim’ is a quickly transposable term: it can shift from minute to minute, from the Jew killed by suicide bombers on a bus to the Palestinian child killed by Israeli gunfire. The public sphere needs to be one in which both kinds of violence are challenged insistently and in the name of justice. If we think that to criticise Israeli violence, or to call for economic pressure to be put on the Israeli state to change its policies, is to be ‘effectively anti-semitic’, we will fail to voice our opposition for fear of being named as part of an anti-semitic enterprise. No label could be worse for a Jew, who knows that, ethically and politically, the position with which it would be unbearable to identify is that of the anti-semite. The ethical framework within which most progressive Jews operate takes the form of the following question: will we be silent (and thereby collaborate with illegitimately violent power), or will we make our voices heard (and be counted among those who did what they could to stop that violence), even if speaking poses a risk? The current Jewish critique of Israel is often portrayed as insensitive to Jewish suffering, past as well as present, yet its ethic is based on the experience of suffering, in order that suffering might stop. Summers uses the ‘anti-semitic’ charge to quell public criticism of Israel, even as he explicitly distances himself from the overt operations of censorship. He writes, for instance, that ‘the only antidote to dangerous ideas is strong alternatives vigorously advocated.’ But how does one vigorously advocate the idea that the Israeli occupation is brutal and wrong, and Palestinian self-determination a necessary good, if the voicing of those views calls down the charge of anti-semitism? To understand Summers’s claim, we have to be able to conceive of an effective anti-semitism, one that pertains to certain speech acts. Either it follows on certain utterances, or it structures them, even if that is not the conscious intention of those making them. His view assumes that such utterances will be taken by others as anti-semitic, or received within a given context as anti-semitic. So we have to ask what context Summers has in mind when he makes his claim; in what context is it the case that any criticism of Israel will be taken to be anti-semitic? It may be that what Summers was effectively saying is that the only way a criticism of Israel can be heard is through a certain acoustic frame, such that the criticism, whether it is of the West Bank settlements, the closing of Birzeit and Bethlehem University, the demolition of homes in Ramallah or Jenin, or the killing of numerous children and civilians, can only be interpreted as showing hatred for Jews. We are asked to conjure a listener who attributes an intention to the speaker: so-and-so has made a public statement against the Israeli occupation, and this must mean that so-and-so hates Jews or is willing to fuel those who do. The criticism is thus given a hidden meaning, one that is at odds with its explicit claim. The criticism of Israel is nothing more than a cloak for that hatred, or a cover for a call for discriminatory action against Jews. In other words, the only way to understand effective anti-semitism is to presuppose intentional anti-semitism; the effective anti-semitism of any criticism turns out to reside in the intention of the speaker as retrospectively attributed by the listener. It may be that Summers has something else in mind; namely, that the criticism will be exploited by those who want to see not only the destruction of Israel but the degradation or devaluation of Jewish people in general. There is always that risk, but to claim that such criticism of Israel can be taken only as criticism of Jews is to attribute to that particular interpretation the power to monopolise the field of reception. The argument against letting criticism of Israel into the public sphere would be that it gives fodder to those with anti-semitic intentions, who will successfully co-opt the criticism. Here again, a statement can become effectively anti-semitic only if there is, somewhere, an intention to use it for anti-semitic purposes. Indeed, even if one believed that criticisms of Israel are by and large heard as anti-semitic (by Jews, anti-semites, or people who could be described as neither), it would become the responsibility of all of us to change the conditions of reception so that the public might begin to distinguish between criticism of Israel and a hatred of Jews. Summers made his statement as president of an institution which is a symbol of academic prestige in the United States, and although he claimed he was speaking not as president of the university but as a ‘member of our community’, his speech carried weight in the press precisely because he was exercising the authority of his office. If the president of Harvard is letting the public know that he will take any criticism of Israel to be effectively anti-semitic, then he is saying that public discourse itself ought to be so constrained that such statements are not uttered, and that those who utter them will be understood as engaging in anti-semitic speech, even hate speech. Here, it is important to distinguish between anti-semitic speech which, say, produces a hostile and threatening environment for Jewish students – racist speech which any university administrator would be obliged to oppose and regulate – and speech which makes a student uncomfortable because it opposes a particular state or set of state policies that he or she may defend. The latter is a political debate, and if we say that the case of Israel is different, that any criticism of it is considered as an attack on Israelis, or Jews in general, then we have singled out this political allegiance from all other allegiances that are open to public debate. We have engaged in the most outrageous form of ‘effective’ censorship.

4. No link: the aff opens up criticism on the state of Israel not Jews. We can criticize states without degrading the people. For example, I can criticize what the government of France does without being racist to French people.

5. Link turn: continued suppression of Palestinian activism breeds resentment within pro-Palestine activists which triggers anti-Semitic activity. The only solution to on campus anti-Semitism is to end the censorship arms race

#### Censoring pro-Palestine speech on the grounds it is anti-Semitic is what leads to internal oppression amongst Jews

Lazare 15 [Sarah Lazare, staff writer at Common Dreams, “How US Colleges Have Become Ground Zero for Suppression of Palestine Solidarity,” Common Dreams, Sept. 30, 2015, <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2015/09/30/how-us-colleges-have-become-ground-zero-suppression-palestine-solidarity>] JW

According to another report released Wednesday by Jewish Voice for Peace, entitled Stifling Dissent: How Israel's Defenders Use False Charges of anti-Semitism to Limit the Debate Over Israel on Campus, these campaigns are also doing profound damage to Jewish communities across the country. "Far right political organizations, like StandWithUs and the Zionist Organization of America, as well as many prominent Jewish organizations with much broader communal mandates, such as Hillel International, Jewish Federations (specifically their Israel on Campus Coalition), and the Anti-Defamation League, intervene on campuses in efforts to muzzle political criticisms of Israeli policies," the report states. The study highlights the common tactic of conflating anti-Semitism with criticism of Israel, and equating all Jews with the Israeli state, in an effort to shut down debate. In practice, this often takes the form of bullying within Jewish communities, JVP states, as well as claims that the emotional discomfort of Israel supporters amounts to targeted harassment. "The effect is marginalization of Jewish students from Jewish communities, exclusion of Palestinian, Muslim, Arab and other students who support Palestinian rights from Jewish spaces, and restrictions on programming relating to Israel," the report charges. For example, a Jewish organization at Swarthmore faced legal threats from the Jewish campus organization Hillel International after declaring themselves an "Open Hillel" and hosting an event featuring 1960s civil rights organizers who now do Palestine solidarity work. "With Hillel International, what has happened is that, even if you're Jewish, you can't bring your full political views into the organization," Josh Wolfsun, Swarthmore student and member of the group—which has since changed its name to Kehilah—told Common Dreams. "There are a whole host of Jewish advocates and intellectuals who can't walk through the doors of the Hillel house in any official capacity. Students are told you can only bring part of yourself." Such use of anti-Semitism to gain political leverage, or inflict censorship of legitimate speech, "threatens to void the term of any meaning," the report argues. "Put simply, not all Jews are Israeli nor do they always support the policies of the Israeli government (and furthermore, not all Israelis are Jewish–over 20% of Israeli citizens are of Palestinian descent)." What's more, the report notes, "students who are particularly vulnerable to surveillance, censorship and intimidation are deliberately targeted by Israel-aligned organizations," particularly Palestinians, Muslims, and Arabs. And finally, the report urges, debate must be permitted because "the decades-old Israeli military occupation, the refugee status of millions of Palestinians, and the expansion of Israeli control over Palestinian life and land are among the most urgent social and political issues of our time." Both studies underscore that, despite the repression, movements on U.S. campuses, and across the world, continue to grow. "Even in the face of a variety of repressive measures, the movement for Palestinian rights continues to draw strength from the force of its ideas and the real prospect that changes to U.S. public opinion—and one day access to justice for the Palestinian people—are indeed possible," Palestine Legal and CCR concluded. "Legal, political, and educational institutions should permit this important debate to continue freely, lest they find themselves on the wrong side of history."

## AT Hate Speech DA

1. Turn: the aff decreases hate speech. “Patriotic correctness” is what justifies Islamophobia and discrimination against anyone who fits the stereotype of the “dangerous middle eastern other.”
2. No link- aff only defends speech that criticizes the military- not hate speech. Even if we grant you a link it is comparatively tiny.

3. Traditional arguments regarding structural violence get co-opted by the political right in favor of tokenism that allows the university to claim moral righteousness. The aff is a necessary pre-req to resolving any structural abuses in the university

Chatterjee & Maira 14 [Piya Chatterjee, Backstrand Chair and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Scripps College, Sunaina Maira, Professor of Asian American Studies at UC Davis, “The Imperial University: Academic Repression and Scholarly Dissent,” University of Minnesota Press, 2014] JW

In effect, the neoliberal structuring of the university is also a racial strategy of management of an increasingly diverse student population, as increasing numbers of minority and immigrant students have entered public higher education. Well-funded, neoconservative organizations and partisan groups, such as ACTA, David Horowitz’s Freedom Center, and Campus Watch, have placed ethnic studies, feminist and queer studies, and critical cultural studies in their bull’s-eye as the political project of leftist professors running amok in the academy and teaching biased curricula. In addition, campaigns such as Horowitz’s Academic Bill of Rights and Student Bill of Rights constructed the figure of a new victim in the culture wars: the “American student” whose freedom to challenge these partisan faculty had been suppressed .56 According to these right-wing campaigns, “radical” scholars were force-feeding U.S. college students with antiAmerican views, and right-wing students were being marginalized and “discriminated” against due to their political ideology and affirmative action programs. Thus the language of marginalization and exclusion was turned on its head, as the discourse of right-wing victimhood and ideological discrimination was unleashed against the political movements and intellectual projects that opposed racial and class inequality. In addition, the right appropriated the language of “diversity,” a key point of contradiction in the academic culture wars. For example, the “Students for Academic Freedom” campaign launched by Horowitz used the notion of “intellectual pluralism” to mask its well-orchestrated attack on the left. 57 The cultural right manufactured a portrait of itself as the true advocate of intellectual pluralism and freedom, remaking diversity through a “free market” model based on the right to choice in the marketplace of ideas. 58 The notion of choice, central to models of flexible accumulation and global economic competitiveness for proponents of neoliberal capitalism, underlies the tenet of intellectual choice. A “weak” multiculturalism and liberal notion of tolerance thus served the right well, for they used it to argue that the problem was not simply that of “diversity,” which they apparently embraced, but that there wasn’t enough “intellectual diversity” on college campuses. Teaching, and also research, was becoming one-sided, to the detriment of those upholding “true” American values, who were increasingly marginalized in hotbeds of left indoctrination into anti-Americanism on college campuses. In addition, as Pulido’s case study demonstrates, as faculty and administrators of color—not to mention women— have made their way into the ranks of university management, academic institutions can hide behind the language of racial (and gender) representativeness and tokenist inclusion to deflect critiques of systemic problems with faculty governance.

Opening up dialogue makes it possible to recapture speech and turn it into a tool of validation for oppressed groups. Re-appropriation of the word “queer” empirically proves this

Butler 97, [Judith, 1997, *Excitable Speech*. New York, NY: Routledge, CJS]

Neither view can account for the restaging and resignifying of offensive utterance, deployments of linguistic power that seek at once to expose and counter the offensive exercise of speech. I will consider these at greater length in the chapters to come, but consider for a nioment how often such terms are subject to resignification. Such a redoubling of injurious speech takes place not only in rap music and in various forms of political parody and satire, but in the political and social critique of such speech, where "mentioning"10 those very terms is crucial to the arguments at hand, and even in the legal arguments that make the call for censorship, in which the rhetoric that is deplored is invariably proliferated within the context oflegal speech. Paradoxi- cally, the explicit legal and political arguments that seek to tie such speech to certain contexts fail to note that even in their own discourse, such speech has become citational, breaking with the prior contexts of its utterance and acquiring new contexts for which it was not intended. The critical and legal discourse on hate speech is itself a restaging of the performance of hate speech. The present discourse breaks with the prior ones, but not in any absolute sense. On the contrary, the present context and its apparent "break" with the past are themselves legible only in terms of the past from which it breaks. The present context does, however, elaborate a new context for such speech, a future con- text, not yet delineable and, hence, not yet precisely a context. The arguments in favor of a counter-appropriation or restaging of offensive speech are clearly undercut by the position that the offensive effect of the speech act is necessarily linked to the speech act, its origi- nating or enduring context or, indeed, its animating intentions or orig- inal deployments. The revaluation of terms such as "queer" suggest that speech can be "returned" to its speaker in a different form, that it can be cited against its originary purposes, and perform a reversal of effects. More generally, then, this suggests that the changeable power of such terms marks a kind of discursive performativity that is not a discrete series of speech acts, but a ritual chain of resignifications whose origin and end remain unfixed and unfixable. In this sense, an "act" is not a momentary happening, but a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that exceeds the moment it occasions. The possibility for a speech act to resignify a prior context depends, in part, upon the gap between the originating context or intention by which an utterance is animated and the effects it produces. For the threat, for instance, to have a future it never intended, for it to be returned to its speaker in a different form, and defused through that return, the meanings the speech act acquires and the effects it per- forms must exceed those by which it was intended, and the contexts it assumes must not be quite the \_same as the ones in which it originates (ifsuch an origin is to be found). Those who seek to fix with certainty the link between certain speech acts and their injurious effects will surely lament the open tem- porality of the speech act. That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard by which the injuries of speech might be effectively acljudicated. Such a loosening of the link between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back, that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link. Thus, the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relentless search for legal remedy. The interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition and resignification of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through time, become disjoined from their power to injure and recontextualized in more affirmative modes. I hope to make clear that by affirmative, I mean "opening up the possibility of agency; where agency is not the restoration of a sovereign autonomy in speech, a replication of conventional notions of mastery.

## AT Trump Politics DA

1. No link: even if Trump is against politically correct politics and pro free speech, they need a specific link to Trump wanting to encourage anti-Zionist speech

2. Link turn: affirming Palestinian identity and combatting Islamophobia on campus is a rebuttal of the Islamophobia that Trump built his campaign on which decreases his political capital

## AT Protests DA

1. Non-unique – the aff is only one more thing students can protest about, there are already a thousand protests going on.
2. Impact turn – protests in this scenario are probably a good thing – we are not telling the government to do something but rather this spills over into actual material solvency and helps Palestinians and other reform movements

## AT Title IX DA

1. aff only defends speech that criticizes anti-Zionism- not hate speech. Even if we grant you a link it is comparatively tiny.
2. Empirically denied- free speech schools like Uchicago or public colleges still get Title IX protections easily. s

# Frontlines- CP

## AT Holocaust Denial PIC

## AT Agent CPs General

1. Agent Counterplans aren’t competitive with the aff. The nature of ought claims means the CP doesn’t deny the truth of the aff.

Damerdji 16 Salim, “An Argument Against the States CP” NSD Update, 2016 http://nsdupdate.com/2016/01/12/an-argument-against-the-states-cp-by-salim-damerdji/

There is no entity with the power to decide between state & federal action…. Why do we need to get further into educational or fairness concerns? The choice posed by the counterplan is silly because no entity has the power to choose between the plan and the counterplan. That is the real damage done by the states counterplan: Voting negative rejects the plan for a reason nobody should consider. I find this argument compelling, but if you don’t, consider the following analogy. Suppose you are a security guard working the night-shift at an art museum. You realize a disgruntled co-worker is wandering around, and to your dismay, punching painting after painting. You could run up to your co-worker and tackle them, but that would certainly damage the next painting. In an ideal world, your co-worker would stop their rampage on their own. But based on their aggressive demeanor, you figure this is unlikely. So the choice is yours: tackle your co-worker (and definitely cause more harm) or do nothing at all with the hope that your co-worker will abort their rampage on their own volition. It seems pretty compelling that you should take matters into your own hands. While it’d be ideal for your co-worker to stop their rampage on their own, you have little to no confidence that they will, and so you still have a moral obligation to stop the rampage. Now consider the States CP. The USFG sees serious harm in the status quo. It would be ideal for the 50 states to ban handguns instead of the federal government, but keep in mind, many of these 50 states openly oppose any gun control whatsoever, let alone a handgun ban. Moreover, it’s sheer fantasy to suppose all 50 states would act in unison. In sum, the ideal outcome, whereby the 50 states implement a handgun ban, is virtually zero. Just as the security guard would be foolish to play the odds of not acting, the same would be true for the federal government. In both cases, there’s little to no chance that the ideal actor would actually act. And so the obligation falls back to you, the non-ideal actor. As the language here suggests, this logic applies to all alternate actor CP’s, not just the 50 States CP.[2]

2. Multiple actors can have the same obligation, so proving that the alt actor should take an act doesn’t disprove that the aff should also happen.

# Frontlines-K

## Framing

### Omit

## Generic

### Omit

## A2 Roleplaying Bad

### Omit

## Truth Testing File

### Extension

### AT Koh and Niemi

### AT Redefine better debater

### AT shmagency

### AT Debate is different because you can argue for new rules

### AT Tournament directors don’t enforce TT

### AT judge paradigms/judge deferral

### AT Racist Topics

### AT Allows you to be extremely racist in round

### AT Kritiks are Good

## EM

1. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the framing debate. It forces engagement and ensures that the neg doesn’t moot the 6 minutes of the AC every round.

Overing 15 [Bob Overing, coach for Loyola in Los Angeles and debater for the USC Trojan Debate Squad, “Recovering the Role of the Ballot: Evaluative Modesty in Academic Debate,” Paper presented at the 2015 Alta Argumentation Conference, July 31, 2015]

What I have been calling “modesty” with regard to ROBs is an application of a theory gaining interest among normative ethicists. One “confident” way to go about deciding how one ought to act is to determine what moral system is best and then act on its precepts. A “modest” way is to consider all the relevant moral systems, one’s credence in each of them, and the magnitude of the possible outcomes according to those theories. Philosophers Jacob Ross (2006) and Andrew Sepielli (2010) have defended something like the modest view, but I will not rehash their work here. Overall, they have found that when one is uncertain, the best principles of rational decision-making and our basic intuitions tell us to consider more than one moral theory. Likewise, I ask that debaters and judges consider debating with more than just one narrow ROB. The first major advantage to modesty is that it balances the benefits of policy-based education and critical education derived from continental philosophy, critical race theory, rhetoric, etc. Proponents of both types of education make persuasive arguments for theories and practices that meet their ends (E.g. Strait & Wallace, 2008; Varda & Cook, 2012). Modesty maintains the advantages of both by forcing teams to engage on the assumption that both ROBs matter to the judge’s decision calculus. This prevents teams from talking past each other, which is surprisingly common. For instance, on this year’s college topic, an affirmative could defend legalization of marijuana by presenting the history of violent and racist drug criminalization but simultaneously argue that a disadvantage to legalization based on cartel violence is not germane to their role of the ballot. Or, a policy-based affirmative could argue that the epistemic problems in its representations of the international arena and its call for greater U.S. securitization are irrelevant to whether the plan is a good idea. Both examples of “framing” the debate are a means of hastily excluding discussion, and both are dominant strategies precisely because they enable the complete exclusion of the opposing team’s offense. Ryan Galloway (2007) extols the values of debate as a dialogical conversation, but nothing hampers dialogue more than a confident view of ROBs that allows teams to assert to their opponents, “You must only do X.” I believe that modesty excels at meeting Galloway’s vision for dialogue: Such an approach would have little use for rigid rules of logic or argument, such as stock issues…except to the point where the participants agreed that these were functional approaches. Instead, a dialogic approach encourages evaluations of affirmative cases relative to their performative benefits (p. 3). Indeed, modesty does away with rigid rules for the content of ROBs, embracing what Harrigan (2007) calls “argumentative pluralism” (p. 51-52). While Galloway and Harrigan use these values to motivate defenses of “the resolution as the bright line standard for evaluation” and switch-side debate, respectively, I find modesty a much better compromise. A modest judge can give weight to the effects of a plan while still considering “pre-fiat” problems of representation, ideology, epistemology, and the like. Rather than attempting to fit one set of arguments into another’s toolbox, modesty allows teams to do what they do best without excluding the opposition wholesale. One objection at this point may be that the modest strategy decreases clash or stasis around a single topic. Without narrowing debates through a filter such as the resolution or even a broad “three-tier process” (See Bankey, 2013, p. 44; Reid-Brinkley, 2008, p. 84), modesty allows any ROB. However, on modesty, there is a larger strategic incentive to engage because the opposition’s route to the ballot will always be relevant, never merely excluded or precluded. A final advantage of modesty is to return ROBs to the realm of normal argument evaluation. Confidence imbues the ROB with a special reverence that is unpredictable and unfair to the competitors. When weighing warming vs. economic collapse, judges do not first decide which impact to grant priority and second which team has the best links to that impact. Judges consider the strength of link to those impacts, so even if one impact is worse, its likelihood as a result of the plan is also relevant. The same goes for any other aspect of debate, and seeing the ROB as analogous to these instances of impact framing may make modesty much more intuitively appealing.

2. Extend the Mills 05 evidence. Real world oppression cannot be essentialized by any one theory which will inevitably fail to account for how different structures create material conditions. This warrants modesty.

## AT Affropess Short

### Omit

## AT Affropess Long

### Omit

## AT Generic State Bad

### Omit

## AT Cap

### Omit

## AT Free Speech K

* + 1. No link- the aff doesn’t pretend that everyone has 100% equal access to free speech, it just says it is better to help some people than no people at all.
    2. NU everyone is always disturbed unequally, even in utopian socialist societies certain people are born smarter, taller, etc. We shouldn’t reject anything that is a little bit unequal.

## AT Secrecy K

### Omit

## AT Heg Good K

### Omit

## AT Academy K

### Omit

# Frontlines- NC

## Overview/Extensions

### Omit

## AT Kant

### Omit

## AT: Kant

### Omit

### AT Case

### Omit

## AT Skep

### Omit

## AT Hobbes

### omit

## AT Constituion

## AT Levinas

## EM

Use epistemic modesty to account for the chance that you are wrong on the framework debate. That’s probability of the moral framework being true multiplied by the value of an action under that framework

Christensen 13 [David Christensen, Professor of Philosophy @ Brown University, “Epistemic Modesty Defended”. The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, edited by David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, Oxford University Press, 2013]

One might, of course, give up entirely on epistemic modesty. But I think that such a radical approach would be misguided. We are fallible thinkers, and we know it. We know that it often happens that we evaluate the arguments and evidence on a certain topic—as carefully and conscientiously as we possibly can—and reach the wrong conclusion. That is to say, we often make epistemic mistakes. And we know that simply looking over the arguments and evidence again, no matter how carefully and conscientiously, cannot be expected disclose our mistakes to us. That being so, it seems clear that a person who was interested in having accurate beliefs, and, thus, in correcting her epistemic errors, would not be rational to let her confidence in P be unaffected by evidence that she was especially prone to making epistemic mistakes about P. It would be irrational even in instances where the person had in fact managed to avoid epistemic error in her original thinking about P. To give one example: suppose a doctor, after reaching a confident diagnosis based on a patient’s symptoms and test-results, comes to realize that she’s severely sleep-deprived, that she’s under the influence of powerful judgment-distorting drugs, that she’s emotionally involved with the patient in a way likely to warp her judgment, or that many sober clinicians, on the basis of the same symptoms and tests, have reached a contrary diagnosis. Perhaps she learns all of these things! In such a case, it seems quite clear to me that it would be highly irrational for her to maintain undiminished confidence in her diagnosis.21 So I don’t think that we may plausibly resolve the tension by denying epistemic modesty entirely.

# Frontlines- T/Theory Counter-Interps

## AT Solvency Advncate Theory

### omit

## AT T Any

### Omit

## No ‘Which Aff’ Good

### Omit

## TJFs good

### Omit

# 1AR theory

### Omit

# 1AC – Racism Adv

## Part 1: Framework

#### The role of the ballot is to evaluate the simulated consequences of the affirmative policy vs a competing neg policy option to reduce material oppression.

#### 1. The aff deploys the state to learn scenario planning- even if politics is bad, scenario analysis of politics is pedagogically valuable- it enhances creativity, deconstructs biases and teaches advocacy skills

Barma et al 16 May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19,

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science? Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. The Art of Scenario Analysis We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8 An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### 2. Ideal theory strips away particularities making ethics inaccessible and epistemically skewed

Mills 05, Charles, 2005, Ideal Theory” as Ideology,

“The crucial common claim—whether couched in terms of ideology and fetishism, or androcentrism, or white normativity—is that **all theorizing**, both moral and nonmoral, **takes place in an intellectual realm dominated by** concepts, assumptions, norms, **values, and framing perspectives that reflect the experience** and group interests **of the privileged group** (whether the bourgeoisie, or men, or whites). So a simple empiricism will not work as a cognitive strategy; one has to be self-conscious about the concepts that “spontaneously” occur to one, since many of these concepts will not arise naturally but as the result of social structures and hegemonic ideational patterns. In particular, it will often be the case that **dominant concepts will obscure** certain **crucial realities**, blocking them from sight, or **naturalizing them**, while on the other hand, concepts necessary for accurately mapping these realities will be absent. Whether in terms of concepts of the self, or of humans in general, or in the cartography of the social, it will be necessary to scrutinize the dominant conceptual tools and the way the boundaries are drawn. This is, of course, the burden of standpoint theory—that certain realities tend to be more visible from the perspective of the subordinated than the privileged (Harding 2003). The thesis can be put in a strong and implausible form, but weaker versions do have considerable plausibility, as illustrated by the simple fact that for the most part the crucial conceptual innovation necessary to map nonideal realities has not come from the dominant group. **In** its **ignoring** of **oppression, ideal theory** also **ignores the consequences of oppression.** If societies are not oppressive, or **if in modeling them we can abstract** away from oppression **and assume moral cognizers of** roughly **equal skill, then the paradigmatic moral agent can be featureless. No theory is required about the particular group-based obstacles that may block the vision of a particular group.** By contrast, **nonideal theory recognizes that people will** typically **be cognitively affected by their social location, so that** on both the macro and the more local level, **the descriptive concepts arrived at may be misleading.**” (175)

#### 3. No act omission distinction for states means means based theories collapse to consequentialism.

Sunstein and Vermule 05[Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule. The University of Chicago Law School. “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs.” JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 239. The Chicago Working Paper Series. March 2005]

In our **view,** both the argument from causation and the argument from intention **go wrong by** overlook**ing** the distinctive features of government **as a moral** agent. Whatever the general status of the act-omission distinction as a matter of moral philosophy,38 the distinction is least impressive when applied to government.39 The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything, or refusing to act.40 Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private actionfor example, private killing—becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action, but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it.

## Part 2: Plan

#### Resolved: Public colleges and universities in the United States ought not restrict any constitutionally protected speech that criticizes the State of Israel.

Volokh 16 [Eugene Volokh, teaches free speech law, religious freedom law, church-state relations law, a First Amendment Amicus Brief Clinic, and tort law, at UCLA School of Law, where he has also often taught copyright law, criminal law, and a seminar on firearms regulation, “University of California Board of Regents is wrong about ‘anti-Zionism’ on campus,” The Washington Post, March 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/03/16/university-of-california-board-of-regents-is-wrong-about-anti-zionism-on-campus/?utm\_term=.cfab0cd93ad6] JW

The University of California Board of Regents has just released its Final Report of the Regents Working Group on Principles Against Intolerance, which includes a proposed set of such principles. I hope to blog some more about the actual proposal in the coming days, but what has made the news is the passage in the introduction to the report’s “Contextual Statement” that says: Fundamentally, commenters noted that historic manifestations of anti-Semitism have changed and that expressions of anti-Semitism are more coded and difficult to identify. In particular, opposition to Zionism[1] often is expressed in ways that are not simply statements of disagreement over politics and policy, but also assertions of prejudice and intolerance toward Jewish people and culture. Anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism and other forms of discrimination have no place at the University of California…. [Footnote 1:] Merriam Webster defines Zionism as follows: an international movement originally for the establishment of a Jewish national or religious community in Palestine and later for the support of modern Israel…. The Oxford American Dictionary defines Zionism as follows: A movement for (originally) the reestablishment and (now) the development and protection of a Jewish nation in what is now Israel. I’m ethnically Jewish (I say “ethnically” because I’m not religious), and I support Israel. It’s the one democracy among its neighbors, and for all its flaws it’s doing a pretty good job faced with very difficult circumstances. Whatever one might say about whether Israel should have been created in 1948, it’s there, and undoing that decision would be a disaster in many ways. And I do think that a good deal of anti-Zionism is indeed anti-Semitic. But I think the regents are flat wrong to say that “anti-Zionism” has “no place at the University of California.” Even though they’re not outright banning anti-Zionist speech, but rather trying to sharply condemn it, I think such statements by the regents chill debate, especially by university employees and students who (unlike me) lack tenure. (For more on that, see here.) And this debate must remain free, regardless of what the regents or I think is the right position in the debate. Whether the Jewish people should have an independent state in Israel is a perfectly legitimate question to discuss — just as it’s perfectly legitimate to discuss whether Basques, Kurds, Taiwanese, Tibetans, Northern Cypriots, Flemish Belgians, Walloon Belgians, Faroese, Northern Italians, Kosovars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians, Transnistrians, Chechens, Catalonians, Eastern Ukranians and so on should have a right to have independent states. Sometimes the answer might be “yes.” Sometimes it might be “no.” Sometimes the answer might be “it depends.” But there’s no uncontroversial principle on which these questions can be decided. They have to be constantly up for inquiry and debate, especially in places that are set up for inquiry and debate: universities. Whether Israel is entitled to exist as an independent Jewish state is just as fitting a subject for discussion as whether Kosovo or Northern Cyprus or Kurdistan or Tawain or Tibet or a Basque nation should exist as an independent state for those ethnic groups. Of course, Israel is different from the other countries in that it has already been internationally recognized as an independent state. But while that’s an important practical argument, and an important argument under international law, it can’t determine what should be talked about at universities. International recognition can be granted, and it can be taken away. Certainly international recognition doesn’t conclusively resolve either moral or pragmatic questions about whether an ethnic group is entitled to a state of their own. The United Nations of 1947, or the great majority of the governments of today, may have been right or they may have been wrong. We can’t decide even for ourselves whether they’re right or wrong without hearing a lively debate about the subject. And certainly the University of California Board of Regents ought not prejudge this debate. I entirely agree that, to give an example given by the regents, “vandalism targeting property associated with Jewish people or Judaism” should be condemned and punished. I think that UCLA student government should not be allowed to discriminate against Jewish candidates for student government positions. And I agree, as I said, that some anti-Zionist speech and speakers are indeed hostile to Jews as an ethnic group, rather than just opposing a particular government or nation-state. But the regents should not be telling professors and students that “there is no place” at the University of California for a political viewpoint on the existence of Israel as a nation-state — a statement that is likely to and intended to deter debate on that subject. Indeed, universities are the very places where such matters should indeed be discussed.

#### Empirics prove that there is systemic obstruction of pro-Palestine activism at public colleges and universities

PL 15 [Palestine Legal, an independent organization dedicated to defending and advancing the civil rights and liberties of people in the US who speak out for Palestinian freedom, “The Palestine Exception,” September 2015, <http://palestinelegal.org/the-palestine-exception#notes>] JW

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Over the last decade, a dynamic movement in support of Palestinian human rights, particularly active in US colleges and universities, has helped raise public awareness regarding the Israeli government’s violations of international law, as well as the role of corporations and the US government in facilitating these abuses. This activism, fueled by Israel’s increasingly destructive assaults on Gaza, presents a robust and sustainable challenge to the longstanding orthodoxy in the United States that excuses, justifies, and otherwise supports discriminatory Israeli government policies. Fearful of a shift in domestic public opinion, Israel’s fiercest defenders in the United States—a network of advocacy organizations, public relations firms, and think tanks—have intensified their efforts to stifle criticism of Israeli government policies. Rather than engage such criticism on its merits, these groups leverage their significant resources and lobbying power to pressure universities, government actors, and other institutions to censor or punish advocacy in support of Palestinian rights. In addition, high-level Israeli government figures, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and wealthy benefactors such as Sheldon Adelson and Haim Saban have reportedly participated in strategic meetings to oppose Palestine activism, particularly boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaigns. These heavy-handed tactics often have their desired effect, driving institutions to enact a variety of punitive measures against human rights activists, such as administrative sanctions, censorship, intrusive investigations, viewpoint-based restriction of advocacy, and even criminal prosecutions. Such efforts intimidate activists for Palestinian human rights, chill criticism of Israeli government practices, and impede a fair-minded dialogue on the pressing question of Palestinian rights. This Report, the first of its kind, documents the suppression of Palestine advocacy in the United States. In 2014, Palestine Legal—a nonprofit legal and advocacy organization supporting Palestine activism—responded to 152 incidents of censorship, punishment, or other burdening of advocacy for Palestinian rights and received 68 additional requests for legal assistance in anticipation of such actions. In the first six months of 2015 alone, Palestine Legal responded to 140 incidents and 33 requests for assistance in anticipation of potential suppression. These numbers understate the phenomenon, as many advocates who are unaware of their rights or afraid of attracting further scrutiny stay silent and do not report incidents of suppression. The overwhelming majority of these incidents—89 percent in 2014 and 80 percent in the first half of 2015—targeted students and scholars, a reaction to the increasingly central role universities play in the movement for Palestinian rights. The tactics used to silence advocacy for Palestinian rights frequently follow recognizable patterns. Activists and their protected speech are routinely maligned as uncivil, divisive, antisemitic, or supportive of terrorism. Institutional actors—primarily in response to pressure from Israel advocacy groups—erect bureaucratic barriers that thwart efforts to discuss abuses of Palestinian rights and occasionally even cancel events or programs altogether. Sometimes the consequences are more severe: universities suspend student groups, deny tenure to faculty, or fire them outright in response to their criticism of Israel. Meritless lawsuits and legal threats, which come from a variety of Israel advocacy groups identified in this Report, burden Palestinian rights advocacy and chill speech even when dismissed by the courts. Campaigns by such groups have even resulted in legislation to curtail Palestine advocacy, criminal investigations, and filing of charges against activists. Specifically, the Report documents the following tactics employed to undermine advocacy for Palestinian rights. False and Inflammatory Accusations of Antisemitism and Support for Terrorism: The Israel advocacy groups identified here devote considerable resources to monitoring the speech and activities of Palestinian rights advocates and falsely accusing them of antisemitism, based solely on their criticism of Israeli policy, in order to undermine their advocacy. Such conflation silences meaningful conversation about Palestinian rights and distracts from genuine forms of hatred and antisemitism. Some groups also accuse Arab-American, Muslim, and other Palestine solidarity activists of supporting or sympathizing with terrorism—an inflammatory charge often lodged without evidence. In 2015, for example, the anonymously run website Canary Mission published a list of organizations and activists it accused of supporting terrorism, including campus chapters of the Muslim Student Association, which it refers to as a “virtual terror factory.” The website seeks to “expose” individuals and student groups as “anti-Freedom, anti-American and anti-Semitic” to schools and prospective employers. Official Denunciation: In response to outside pressure, institutional actors sometimes pronounce official disapproval of the legitimate views and actions of Palestine advocates, frequently by unfairly characterizing Palestine activism, particularly support for BDS, as improperly “delegitimizing” Israel or as uncivil, divisive, or not conducive to dialogue. Such misleading framing, promoted by certain Israel advocacy groups and predominantly reserved for speech in support of Palestine, barely masks the officials’ underlying disagreement with the viewpoint of Palestine activists. In late 2014, for example, University of California president Janet Napolitano denounced a campaign which asked student government candidates to make an “ethics pledge” to refuse free trips from Israel advocacy groups as violating principles of “civility, respect, and inclusion.” Her predecessor, Mark Yudof, likened a peaceful protest against a talk by former Israeli soldiers to hanging nooses, drawing swastikas, and vandalizing a campus LGBTQIA center. Bureaucratic Barriers: University officials routinely erect administrative obstacles or abruptly alter school policies so as to hamper student organizing for Palestinian rights. These measures include creating impediments to reserving rooms and forcing students to obtain advance approval for events, pay security fees, and attend mandated meetings with administrators. Though seemingly neutral, these policies sometimes target and frequently disproportionately burden speech in favor of Palestinian rights. For example, in 2014, administrators at The City University of New York’s (CUNY) College of Staten Island repeatedly called members of Students for Justice in Palestine and their faculty advisor into meetings to question them about events and social media postings, urged the group to hold events alongside Israel advocacy groups, and instructed members to submit promotional flyers for official authorization. Cancellations and Alterations of Academic and Cultural Events: From campus lectures and community discussions to art and film exhibitions, public events critical of Israeli policy often come under attack, forcing organizers to cancel, move, or substantially alter the programs. Israel advocacy groups frequently contend that programs lack “balance” or are antisemitic. For example, in the spring of 2015, the Missouri History Museum decided, after receiving complaints from Israel advocacy organizations, that an event on solidarity between activists working for justice in Ferguson, Mexico, and Palestine could not proceed unless organizers removed references to Palestine. In 2012, the University of California’s Hastings Law School withdrew its official support of a conference entitled “Litigating Palestine” after being pressured by Israel advocacy groups. Administrative Sanctions: Universities often respond to complaints from Israel advocacy groups by investigating and disproportionately disciplining students and student groups for events and actions in support of Palestinian rights. For example, Loyola University Chicago launched an investigation into the school’s chapter of Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) in fall 2014, after students lined up at a Birthright Israel table to ask questions that highlighted the discriminatory nature of the program, which excludes non-Jews. After a lengthy investigation, university administrators ultimately suspended the SJP group for the remainder of the year for failing to register the “demonstration.” Yet the administration chose not to suspend the campus Hillel chapter for similarly failing to register its tabling event, instead merely requiring the chapter group to meet with administrators to review school policy. In spring 2014, Northeastern University in Boston suspended a student group after members distributed flyers describing Israel’s policy of demolishing Palestinian homes. Public outcry and the threat of legal action, however, forced the university to reverse course and reinstate the group. Threats to Academic Freedom: Israel advocacy groups often target academics critical of Israeli policies or supportive of Palestinian rights. Campaigns against faculty — from Columbia University to the University of California at Los Angeles — sully reputations, instigate university investigations, and can even lead to termination of employment. For example, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, succumbing to pressure from Israel advocacy groups and donors, summarily dismissed Professor Steven Salaita from a tenured faculty position at the outset of the fall 2014 semester because it deemed his personal tweets criticizing Israel’s 2014 assault on Gaza to be “uncivil.” San Francisco State University launched an investigation of Professor Rabab Abdulhadi in spring 2014, forcing her to defend a research trip to Palestine, after an Israel advocacy group accused her of abusing taxpayer funds and meeting with “known terrorists.” In fall 2014, the AMCHA Initiative, an Israel advocacy group, issued a blacklist of more than 200 Middle East Studies professors it declared to be “anti-Israel.”

## Part 3: Offense

### Advantage: Racism

#### a) Islamophobia: Post 9/11, pro-Palestine movements were conflated with Jihadism leading to rampant Islamophobia which the university took an active role in. At a time where Islamophobia is being peddled at massive scale, dissent from the other side is key to breaking down the specter of the Muslim as a terrorist other.

Bazian 15 [Bazian, Hatem. "The Islamophobia Industry and the Demonization of Palestine: Implications for American Studies." American Quarterly 67.4 (2015): 1057-1066] JW

The 2001 attacks introduced a shift in US foreign policy and introduced a more muscular and military interventionist approach toward the Arab and Muslim world with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a robust US military presence in over thirty new countries.14 The coinciding of the 9/11 attacks with the start of the second Palestinian Intifada presented a golden opportunity for a strong cadre of neoconservatives connected to the American Enterprise Institute to push for a more decisively pro-Israeli stand in the Bush administration.15 The top tier of the Bush administration adopted a neoconservative line of thinking.16 The neoconservatives in the administration were committed to Israel’s defense and opposed to territorial compromise with the Palestinians; several had participated in drafting the “Clean Break” strategy in 1998.17 The post–September 11 shift focused on a preemptive strategy directed at what they called “terrorist” organizations with global reach and nation-states that provide support or shelter to groups, such as Al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations, but not groups engaged in national struggles like Palestinian factions and the Basque separatists in Spain. President Bush’s “either you are with us or with the terrorists” framing forced nation-states to make policy decisions to facilitate access to execute this global war. The global alliance that emerged cooperated in the “War on Terror,” with Israel playing a central role, providing training and know-how and marketing its “extensive expertise” in fighting terrorism. Israel’s security agencies jumped into the counterterrorism-training business and managed to become key players in local, regional, national, and international joint terrorism programs. For example, Urban Shield, a jointcounterterrorism training program held in the San Francisco Bay Area, which centers Islamophobia in its conceptual framework and posits Muslims and Arabs as potential threats in its training program, has the Israeli security team playing a major role in setting the scenarios for supposed terrorist attacks and providing guidance on how to profile terrorists.18 Israel was a key participant in the War on Terror, highlighting the “Iraqi threat” that was presented as directly “linked” to the funding of suicide bombings. Critical to the Iraq campaign was a communication strategy devised by US pro-Israel supporters to influence public opinion and maintain the focus on Saddam Hussein while managing to intensify a negative view of the Pales- tinians. PR firms like the Luntz Research Companies pushed public opinion farther to the right and in support of the Iraq invasion as a way to defend Israel. The PR document prepared by this organization offered specific talking points and recommendations on how to speak about Israel to the US public.19 While some might point to a conspiracy, the reality is that a well-organized, disciplined, and well-funded Zionist and neoconservative network operated in an ideologically fertile and supportive administration with allies in sensitive positions who managed to shape public debates on issues pertaining to war at home and abroad. Indeed, those who operated in this space managed to refortify and again consolidate Israel’s narrative in the United States and dominate the discourse inside academe, including American studies. Israeli spokespeople were very effective in deploying their messaging at the local, regional, and national levels in the United States, while the pro-Palestine responses were often delayed and singular in nature. The communication strategy was built on years of negative stereotyping, and misrepresentation of Arabs and Muslims made the language easier to deploy in an existing productive and orientalist materiality. Edward Said (Orientalism [1978] and Covering Islam [1981]) and Jack Shaheen (Reel Bad Arabs [2001]) ground the subject and point to the cumulative effect of such pro-Israeli strategies. The pro-Israel communication strategy was deployed in existing racist and essentialist representations of Arabs and Muslims, which, in post-9/11, were successfully focused on Palestinians in general and Hamas in particular as the archetypal terrorist. This communication strategy made it possible for Israel to become more connected to US policy formations in fighting the War on Terror. More precisely, Israel’s know-how on fighting Palestinian “terrorism” was peddled and packaged as the best and most successful approach to dealing with a fomented Islamic threat. Overnight, Israel became the model for such a strategy with the emergence of numerous Israel-linked corporate outfits offering training services and counterterrorism strategies that helped consolidate the stereotypical image of the Arab, Muslim, and most definitely Palestinian terrorist across the United States, as joint terrorism task forces and intelligence agencies adopted wholesale the Israeli security framework and thus Israeli communication strategy, with many taking up training courses or visiting Israel with a distinctive and hostile view of Arabs and Muslims upon their return.20 Consequently, the US academy was brought into the same project with immediate development of courses that further problematize Islam and Muslims as archetypal terrorists, investment in teaching the Arabic language as a necessary service to the national security apparatus, and cooperation with Israeli institutions on studying violence and counterterrorism. In addition, several key Islamophobic figures became regular guests at universities, including a select group of Muslims connected and funded by the same Islamophobic industry.21 The result is that Islam and Muslims are studied in the academy as an inferior and terrorist “other” in need of interventions and remedies. Furthermore, the ever-present link to the questions or concerns of Israel-affiliated scholars dominate the framing of Islam and Muslims in the US academy, with a constant litmus test applied to individual scholars on Israel and Palestine, as the latest case of Salaita firing illustrates this point clearly.22 Further, almost all US top leaders have visited Israel to get “educated” about the challenges facing the country and Israel’s effectiveness in fighting “terrorism.” The fully funded trips to Israel by US politicians, journalists, and academics are designed to shape public discourse, since the participants begin to use Israeli talking points when discussing Palestine, Arabs, and Muslims. The participants who went on these fully paid tours included a large number of university presidents and top administrative leaders on campus.23 These trips and Israeli securitized training programs are designed to increase support for Israel and have diverse spokespeople who can influence public opinion and maintain hegemonic backing for Israel in the United States. Recently, Shalom Hartman Institute’s Muslim Leadership Initiative began to target American Muslim leaders for fully funded trips.24

#### The unchallenged pro-Israel lobby is a violent manifestation of latent Islamophobia. Academia is key to disrupt this process.

Bazian 15 [Bazian, Hatem. "The Islamophobia Industry and the Demonization of Palestine: Implications for American Studies." American Quarterly 67.4 (2015): 1057-1066] JW

In a recent article analyzing a host of survey results since 2001, Charles Kurzman concludes that the data illustrate how “American attitudes toward Muslim Americans have grown more negative” and that “a growing segment of the . . . population is willing to express negative views about Muslim Americans in recent years.”28 More alarmingly, the data show that the percentage of Americans responding unfavorably to Muslims in general has steadily increased since 2006. The survey results raise important questions about the causes for such a shift, the forces behind it, and how best to reverse it in the future. Indeed, the alarming data reflect the success of the Islamophobia industry and its massive investment in demonizing Muslims as a launching pad for pro-Israel groups from which to maintain US unconditional support for Israel. One way to understand the unfolding pro-Israel strategy is to extend Edward Said’s use of “Latent” and “Manifest Orientalism” to the study of Islamophobia. Said argued that Arab and Muslim subjects are constructed and “judged in terms of, and in comparison to, the West, so they are always the Other, the conquerable, and the inferior.”29 Kurzman’s and Said’s writings bring into focus the link between what I refer to as latent and manifest Islamophobia.30 Latent Islamophobia is conceived through an inception process using films, news reports, media talking heads, book publishing, and emphasis on Islam as a violent, backward, and oppressive religion inclined toward despotism and lack of progress. Culture production is not independent of politics or economy; rather, it is informed and hegemonically determined by it. Manifest Islamophobia is evident in the speeches and writing of Daniel Pipes, a right-wing Israel supporter and founder of the McCarthyite-type web site Campus Watch. Speaking before the convention of the American Jewish Congress on October 21, 2001, Pipes stated, “I worry very much from the Jewish point of view that the presence, and increased stature, and affluence, and enfranchisement of American Muslims. . . . will present true dangers to American Jews.”31 This offers a glimpse into some of the thinking behind the Islamophobia industry and how it mobilizes to demonize of Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians. Conclusion Academe should take the lead in exploring the entanglement of the pro-Israel groups and organizations in Islamophobia content production. Scholars in American studies should centralize research and teaching about Islamophobia because of the impact it has in normalizing racist discourses in society. I urge American studies scholars to be at the forefront and earnestly embrace Islamophobia studies with intersectionality and connectedness to all struggles for social justice while also affirming the centrality of Palestine’s narrative in the field. In this regard, the forum on Palestine in American studies can play a vital role in collaboratively addressing the Islamophobia crisis with regular panels at the annual conference and regional academic workshops on how to teach and counter it on campus and community levels through partnerships with the American Cultures Community Engaged Scholarship. Lastly, American studies scholars should build robust academic relations with Palestinian universities, foster exchange programs, and proactively seek to centralize Palestinian narratives in the conversation and expose Israel’s role in promoting a racist and hostile campus and civil society environments that seek to limit academic freedom and speech while hiding behind distortions about BDS, Palestine, Islam, Muslims and the “War on Terror.”32

#### Suppression of pro-Palestine movements on campus denies Palestinian students the ability to form solidarity

Nadeau & Sears 11 [Mary-Jo Nadeau and Alan Sears, Mary-Jo Nadeau teaches at the Department of Sociology, University of Toronto-Mississauga. Alan Sears teaches at the Department of Sociology, Ryerson University, Toronto. “This Is What Complicity Looks Like: Palestine and the Silencing Campaign on Campus,” The Bullet, March 5, 2011, http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/475.php] JW

The silencing campaign is particularly dangerous given the overall political climate, which facilitates the neoliberalization of education. The goal of neoliberalism in post-secondary education is to make the universities serve exclusively economic goals, preparing students for the corporate workplace and creating know-how that can be commercialized. This requires a serious culture shift on campuses. One of the core political projects of neoliberalism on campus has been to roll back the spaces for campus activism and freedom of expression originally won by student militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. The campus silencing campaign against Palestine solidarity aligns in important ways with this neoliberal agenda, shutting down political spaces in the interest of a narrow vocational conception of education. Campus equity movements are particular targets in this broader effort, as they have won a certain limited space for themselves, and often critique the limits of the dominant forms of academic knowledge. The silencing campaign around Palestine solidarity organizing has played a leading role in the attack on freedom of expression on campuses. There are in fact two ideas of academic freedom and campus freedom of expression at stake. The first is the narrow and professional conception of academic freedom, which stresses the right of the professor to conduct free inquiry within his or her own specific realm of expertise and to disseminate the results of that inquiry through publication or teaching. This sense of academic freedom informs the influential “Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure” developed in the U.S. in 1915. The second, and more recent, conception of campus freedom of expression and academic freedom was won through struggles from below by the radical student movement of the 1960s. The freedom struggles of African-Americans galvanized activists, including students who fought for the right to build solidarity campaigns on campuses. This was strongly opposed by university administrations, who sought to keep activist politics safely off campus. Nowhere was this struggle sharper than at the Berkeley campus of University of California. There, the Free Speech Movement fought for political rights on campus, challenging the administration of Clark Kerr who was perhaps the most prominent advocate of the technocratic university serving the needs of corporations and the state. Clark Kerr was, in many ways, the forerunner of the current neoliberal strategy of reorganizing universities to focus more clearly on the service of business and the lean state. In the 1960s, Kerr was actually defeated by a mass, militant student movement. But the technocratic vision that the radical student movement of the 1960s successfully defended against has returned in new and aggressive forms under neoliberalism. And part of this agenda is to politically cleanse campuses, stripping away the political rights students won through militancy in the 1960s. The attack on Palestine solidarity is a leading thrust in the current campaign to roll back campus political expression and to define academic freedom in narrow professional terms. The Iacobucci report at York, discussed below, is an important example of this logic. The gains of campus equity movements since the 1960s pose an important obstacle to the narrow definition of academic freedom. Serious struggles against racism, sexism and heterosexism necessarily raise questions about the nature of knowledge and its supposed objectivity. These movements show the ways fundamental inequalities distort knowledge, often in unrecognized ways. Equity movements therefore challenge the conception of expertise that underlies the narrow definition of academic freedom, arguing that the person who experiences systemic inequality often sees it more clearly than someone in a privileged position. As the case for Israeli policy has become harder to make after five years of the highly effective Palestinian-led global Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, pro-Israel advocacy organizations have sought to shut down their opponents through silencing. In doing so, they are not only attempting yet again to shut down any expression of Palestinian experience, but also to weaken protections for freedom of expression and narrow the conception of academic freedom. This is a serious attack, and one that resonates with the neoliberal restructuring of the universities.

#### Attempts to conflate anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism leads to campaigns by pro-Israel groups that demean and marginalize Muslim-American students

Solomon 16 [Daniel J. Solomon, “Inflammatory Pro-Israel Posters Pop Up on Campus — Are They Islamophobic?,” Forward, October 26, 2016, http://forward.com/news/national/352698/inflammatory-pro-israel-posters-pop-up-on-campus-are-they-islamophobic/] JW

A row over Israel on campus is as predictable as the fall of autumn leaves, and it’s no different this season. Fliers accusing pro-Palestinian students of being anti-Semitic have cropped at numerous colleges in October — including the University of Chicago, Tufts University, Brooklyn College and Berkeley — and have been claimed by the David Horowitz Freedom Center, a rightwing organization labeled a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center. “Do you want to show your support for Hamas terrorists whose stated goal whose stated goal is the elimination of the Jewish people and the Jewish state? Join us! Students for Justice in Palestine at Tufts University.” read one flier procured by the Tufts Daily. It also featured a Palestinian militant wrapped in a keffiyeh, or traditional headscarf and toting a machine gun. Other posters included specific callouts to individual faculty and students, accusing them of collaboration with jihadists. According to the anti-Zionist site Electronic Intifada, a flier at San Francisco State University labeled one professor “a leader of the Hamas BDS campaign,” while one at Berkeley said that a professor was a “supporter of Hamas terrorists” and an “Islamophobia alarmist.” Most of the posters featured the slogan #Jewhatred and directed people to the Freedom Center’s Web site. Horowitz’s organization has been termed a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which has described Horowitz as “a driving force of the anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, and anti-black movements.” According to Electronic Intifada, the current poster campaign was preceded by a smaller episode last spring at the University of California–Los Angeles, where the group circulated similar fliers. Critics of the posters — both campus administrators and others — have said they create an atmosphere of fear. “This is not an issue of free speech; this is bullying behavior that is unacceptable and will not be tolerated on our campus,” Leslie Wong, the president of San Francisco State, said in a comment run by Electronic Intifada. Joanne Barker, a professor at the university, told the Web site that her school “should be contacting federal and state authorities to investigate this incident as a hate crime.” Recently, some rightwing Israel advocates have adopted more hard-nosed tactics intended to publicly shame and sanction their perceived enemies. Created last year, one such effort, the Canary Mission, has compiled dossiers on hundreds of students and faculty that it sees as anti-Israel or anti-Semitic – often conflating the two. Another new organization, the Amcha Initiative, has an “anti-Semitism tracker” on its Web site that puts calls for boycotts, divestment, and sanctions against the Jewish state (BDS) in the same category as Jew-hatred. This also comes on the heels of a controversy at Berkeley, where students and faculty clashed with one another over a course that presented Zionism as a “settler colonialist” movement.

#### b) Anti-Semitism: Conflating criticism of Israel with criticism of Jews opens up Jewish students to attacks based on Israel’s actions

Benin 04 [Joel Benin, Professor of Middle East History at Stanford University and a former president of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, “The new American McCarthyism: policing thought about the Middle East,” Institute of Race Relations 0306-3968 Vol. 46(1), 1004] JW

Academic freedom and open debate on Middle East-related issues were very badly served by the widely reported sloppy thinking of Harvard University President Lawrence Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury in the Clinton administration. At the start of the 2002–03 academic year, he addressed a student prayer meeting and argued that harsh criticisms of Israel were ‘anti-Semitic in their effect if not their intent’.21 Among other things, Summers was referring to a petition signed by 600 Harvard and MIT faculty, staff and students to divest university funds from companies that do business in Israel, as a protest against Israel’s continuing occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Similar efforts with a range of formulations of the target were subsequently launched at over forty colleges and universities. One need not support the substance of the demand for divestment in order to discern the difference between anti-Semitism and even the most vehement criticism of Israel. Whatever one thinks of the demand for divestment, it is directed at specific policies of the state of Israel. It is, therefore, not inherently anti-Semitic. Summers may have thought that he was expressing himself in a reasoned way to an academic audience. But the conflation of criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism was an already well-established ploy. The endorsement of this notion by the president of the country’s most prestigious institution of higher learning authorised others to go on the political offensive without fear that they would be criticised as boorish enemies of academic freedom. The ADL, the Likud-affiliated Zionist Organization of America, the American Jewish Committee and the Hillel Foundation (the parent body of the largest Jewish student organisation) have sought to convince federal legislators that there is a wave of anti-Semitism on American campuses. The ADL’s ‘annual audit’ of anti-Semitic activity in America detected an increase of 24 per cent in anti-Semitic activities on US college campuses during 2002.22 However, the entire increase in incidents of anti-Semitism on US campuses, according to the ADL’s own statistics, amounted to twenty-one actions. Among these were several high-profile incidents, most of them motivated by opposition to Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians. Paradoxically, by failing to make a clear distinction between anti-Semitism, which should always and everywhere be opposed, and anti-Zionism, which is a legitimate political opinion, the ADL and like-minded organisations exposed American Jews to attack because they were identified with Israel.

#### Far right positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict that lead to censorship are also what justify marginalization within Jewish communities. Empirics with Hillel International prove

JVP 15 [Jewish Voice for Peace, “STIFLING DISSENT HOW ISRAEL’S DEFENDERS USE FALSE CHARGES OF ANTI-SEMITISM TO LIMIT THE DEBATE OVER ISRAEL ON CAMPUS,” Fall 2015, <https://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/JVP_Stifling_Dissent_Full_Report_Key_90745869.pdf>] JW

On college campuses across the country, there has been a concerted effort to purge anyone supporting BDS or Palestinian rights from mainstream Jewish organizations. In many places, involvement in the Jewish community has become dependent on passing an ideological litmus test. It is no exaggeration to say that this process often mimics McCarthyism -- the period of time in the 1950s when political activists were “blacklisted” and accused of treason or disloyalty by the US government -- in its stridency and intensity. 2.1 Hillel’s Israel Guidelines Hillel is the world’s largest Jewish student organization and is active on more than 550 colleges and universities worldwide. Their stated mission is to “enrich the lives of Jewish undergraduate and graduate students” and to provide a place for people to participate in Jewish communal life on campus. Hillel had traditionally been a home for all Jews, regardless of politics. But in 2010, Hillel International issued new guidelines on Israel, stating that “Hillel will not partner with, house, or host organizations, groups, or speakers that as a matter of policy or practice: •Deny the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state with secure and recognized borders; •Delegitimize, demonize, or apply a double standard to Israel; •Support boycott of, divestment from, or sanctions against the State of Israel; •Exhibit a pattern of disruptive behavior towards campus events or guest speakers or foster an atmosphere of incivility.”11 Hillel’s guidelines encapsulate the pervasive campus atmosphere of ongoing exclusion, marginalization and defamation of Jews whose politics don’t serve the mainstream Jewish agenda on Israel, which is – largely – not to interfere with Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, or inside of Israel. Hillel claims that any individual Jewish student is welcome within Hillel, regardless of that student’s politics. What is explicitly unwelcome is that student’s right to organize for Palestinian rights and to end the Israeli occupation using tactics that are outside of the pro-Israel consensus – a consensus that refrains from confronting Israel too directly. In his op-ed announcing the guidelines, Hillel International CEO Wayne Firestone emphasized a commitment to pluralism in the Jewish community and invoked the Jewish tradition of Talmudic debate as a way to argue that Hillel supports a plethora of political opinion, despite the guidelines. Yet the guidelines explicitly exclude particular views from inclusion within the formal Jewish community. When the guidelines were announced, JVP’s Cecilie Surasky predicted, “These new restrictive guidelines will only further alienate an increasing number of young Jewish students from Hillels, especially those who passionately embrace the values of justice and equality.” Surasky was entirely correct in her prediction. Soon after the guidelines were passed, Brandeis Hillel rejected the campus Jewish Voice for Peace chapter from Hillel membership; a student leader at SUNY Binghamton was forced to resign from Hillel after co-sponsoring an campus event highlighting the Palestinian popular struggle against the Israeli occupation; and Harvard Hillel refused to host an event featuring Israeli politician Avraham Burg because the cosponsor fell outside of the Hillel guidelines. Countless other events, potential student partnerships, and open discussions were no doubt quashed by the guidelines’ heavy shadow. The new student organization Open Hillel was formed in 2012 in response to the pressure put on students to conform to Hillel’s Israel guidelines. Seeking the elimination of the guidelines and dedicated to open discourse, Open Hillel is organizing on college campuses across the country.12 Case studies below look in detail at the ways in which these boundaries limit debate, marginalize dissent, and exclude students from participating in campus iJewish life.

## Part 4: Theory

1. Use reasonability on T interps. The brightline is if I show that you could have predicted this aff and there are 7 minutes of turns to this AC, I am fair. Contradictory definitions of any means neg can always read T on this topic. The neg can always call for more or less specification, depending on the 1AC advocacy. This kills topic discussion because negs are incentivized to always layer the case debate with T and skews time because 1AR’s are always forced to restart.

2. All theory arguments have an implicit aff flex standard- the most recent empirics of late elim rounds show huge neg side bias

Adler 15, Are Judges Just Guessing? A Statistical Analysis of LD Elimination Round Panels by Steven Adler http://nsdupdate.com/2015/03/30/are-judges-just-guessing-a-statistical-analysis-of-ld-elimination-round-panels-by-steven-adler/

Yet a plausible objection here might be that maybe the elimination round data need to be further segmented. For instance, perhaps the data do not meet this randomization because judges can easily distinguish between winners and losers in early elimination rounds, which typically contain more-lopsided matchups, but that in late elimination rounds the decision is much murkier. In fact, I find some support for this hypothesis, though it may be an artifact of a smaller sample-size for this segment.To evaluate this hypothesis, I replicated the above analysis, but pared down to the 36 coded rounds that took place in quarterfinals or later. In these rounds, the Neg side-bias was even more pronounced, with Neg winning 61% of elimination rounds, so the ‘expected’ randomization rate on ballots to achieve such an overall win-rate would be 57% for the Neg and 43% for the Aff. This creates the following expected distribution, compared to the actual observed distribution for these late elimination rounds:

3. Vote aff if I win a counter-interp

a. AFF flex – negative has the ability to win on either layer so the aff needs the same ability in the 2ar. 2AR is too short to win a new shell and play defense against the 2NR theory arguments so the AFF needs reciprocal layers rather than adding more unreciprocal avenues. That’s not a problem in the long 2nr.

b. reciprocity- Only the neg can read T because only the aff has a burden to be topical. Thus the aff needs an RVI to compensate for the neg’s unique avenue to the ballot.

4. Evaluate aff theory lexically prior to neg theory- the neg has the ability to win their shell and beat back the aff shell in the long 2NR, whereas it’s impossible for me to beat back their shell and my shell in the short 2AR. The 2NR explodes neg’s strategic options, but aff needs to sit down on one arg to win in the 2AR. Prefer this weighing

a. its about the structure of aff and neg so it applies to more rounds and is best for setting norms

b. comes on the highest layer- it proves you cannot fairly determine the truth of the 2nr shell because I don’t have adequate time to respond to it. Thus all size of link questions are skewed.

## Part 5: Method

1. Use epistemic modesty to evaluate the method debate- key to decision-making, in all other circumstances we use probability times magnitude to evaluate risk, that’s the definition of game theory. It would be inconsistent to do that here as well.

2. Contesting the policy focus on the AC is bad, prefer the AC framework as long as it is theoretically legitimate.

A: it moots 6 minutes of AC offense since it uplayers my offense, which destroys aff, ground.

B: Also means the neg never has to clash and engage with the aff which means they get superficial education.

C: Coopts all their offense- they can read their role of the ballot when their aff.

3. We should focus on particular circumstances which best tackle material violence.

Pappas 16, Gregory Fernando, The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these problematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to practice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

4. The narrative of “no progress” is affectively appealing but historically imprecise. Political access proves.

**Winant 15**– (2015, Howard, Professor of Sociology at UC-Santa Barbara, “The Dark Matter: Race and Racism in the 21st Century,” Critical Sociology 2015, Vol. 41(2) 313–324).

The World-Historical Shitpile of Race Structural racism – an odious stinkpile of shit left over from the past and still being augmented in the present – has been accumulated by ‘slavery unwilling to die’,4 by empire, and indeed by the entire racialized modern world system. The immense waste (Feagin et al., 2001, drawing on Bataille) of human life and labor by these historically entrenched social structures and practices still confronts us today, in the aftermath of the post-Second World War racial ‘break’. Our antiracist accomplishments have reduced the size of the pile; we have lessened the stink. But a massive amount of waste still remains. So much racial waste is left over from the practice of racial domination in the early days of empire and conquest, to the present combination of police state and liberalism! Indeed it often seems that this enormous and odious waste pinions the social system under an immovable burden. How often have despair and hopelessness overcome those who bore this sorrow? How often have slave and native, peon and maquiladora, servant and ghetto-dweller, felt just plain ‘sick and tired’ (Nappy Roots, 2003), encumbered by this deadening inertia composed of a racial injustice that could seemingly never be budged? How often, too, have whites felt weighed down by the waste, the guilt and self-destruction built into racism and the ‘psychological wage’? Yet racial politics is always unstable and contradictory. Racial despotism can never be fully stabilized or consolidated. Thus at key historical moments, perhaps rare but also inevitable, the sheer weight of racial oppression – qua social structure – becomes insupportable. The built-up rage and inequity, the irrationality and inutility, and the explosive force of dreams denied, are mobilized politically in ways that would have seemed almost unimaginable earlier. Racism remains formidable, entrenched as a structuring feature of both US and global society and politics. Indeed it often seems impossible to overcome. Yet That’s Not the Whole Story We are so used to losing! We can’t see that the racial system is in crisis both in the US and globally. Large-scale demographic and political shifts have overtaken the modern world (racial) system, undermining and rearticulating it. During and after the Second World War a tremendous racial ‘break’ occurred, a seismic shift that swept much of the world (Winant, 2001). The US was but one national ‘case’ of this rupture, which was experienced very profoundly: racial transformations occurred that were unparalleled since at least the changes brought about by the US Civil War. Omi and I (1994) – and many, many others – have proposed that the terrain of racial politics was tremendously broadened and deepened after the War. The increased importance of race in larger political life not only grounded the modern civil rights movement but shaped a whole range of ‘new social movements’ that we take for granted today as central axes of political conflict. In earlier stages of US history it had not been so evident that ‘the personal is political’ – at least not since the end of Reconstruction. From the explicit racial despotism of the Jim Crow era to the ‘racial democracy’ (of course still very partial and truncated) of the present period … : that is a big leap,people. In the modern world there were always black movements, always movements for racial justice and racial freedom. The experience of injustice, concrete grievances, lived oppression, and resistance, both large and small, always exists. It can be articulated or not, politicized or not. These movements, these demands, were largely excluded from mainstream politics before the rise of the civil rights movement after the War. Indeed, after the Second World War, in a huge ‘break’ that was racially framed in crucial ways, this ‘politicization of the social’ swept over the world. It ignited (or reignited) major democratic upsurges. This included the explicitly anti-racist movements: the modern civil rights movement, the anti-apartheid movement, and the anti-colonial movement (India, Algeria, Vietnam, etc.). It also included parallel, and more-or-less allied, movements like ‘secondwave’ feminism, LGBTQ (née gay liberation) movements, and others. In short, the world-historical upheaval of the Second World War and its aftermath were racial upheavals in significant ways: the periphery against the center, the colored ‘others’ against ‘The Lords of Human Kind’ (Kiernan, 1995). These movements produced: • Demographic, economic, political, and cultural shifts across the planet • The destruction of the old European empires • The coming and going of the Cold War • The rise of the ‘new social movements’, led by the black movement in the US And this is only the start of what could be a much bigger list. A Crisis of Race and Racism? ‘[C]risis’, Gramsci famously wrote, ‘consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born: in this interregnum, morbid phenomena of the most varied kind come to pass’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276). Using the Gramscian formula, I suggest that there is such a crisis of race and racism. On the one hand, the old verities of established racism and white supremacy have been officially discredited, not only in the US but fairly comprehensively around the world. On the other hand, racially-informed action and social organization, racial identity and race consciousness, continue unchecked in nearly every aspect of social life! On the one hand, the state (many states around the world) now claims to be colorblind, non-racialist, racially democratic; while on the other hand, in almost every case, those same states need race to rule. Consider in the US alone: race and electoral politics, race and social control, race and legal order … Why don’t our heads explode under the pressures of such cognitive dissonance? Why doesn’t manifest racial contradiction provoke as much uncertainty and confusion in public life and political activity as it does in everyday experience? Are we just supposed to pretend that none of this is happening? Can anyone really sustain the view that they are operating in a nonracial, ‘colorblind’ society? The ‘colorblind’ claim is that one should not ‘notice’ race. For if one ‘sees’ race, one wouldn’t be ‘blind’ to it, after all.5 But what happens to race-consciousness under the pressure (now rather intense in the US, anyway) to be ‘colorblind’? Quite clearly, racial awareness does not dry up like a raisin in the sun. Not only does it continue as a matter of course in everyday life, but in intellectual, artistic and scientific (both social and natural) life race continues to command attention.6 ‘Colorblind’ ideologies of race today serve to impede the recognition of racial difference or racial inequality based on claims that race is an archaic concept, that racial inclusion is already an accomplished fact, and so on. Just so, persistent race-consciousness highlights racial differences and particularities. ‘Noticing’ race can be linked to despotic or democratic motives, framed either in defense of coercion, privilege, and undeserved advantage, or invoked to support inclusion, human rights, and social justice (Carbado and Harris, 2008; see also Brown et al., 2003). Obama Is he a mere token, a shill for Wall Street? Or is he Neo, ‘the one’? If neither alternative is plausible, then we are in the realm of everyday 21st-century US politics. This is the territory in which, as Sam Rayburn famously said, ‘There comes a time in the life of every politician when he [sic] must rise above principle.’ Yet Barack Obama has transformed the US presidency in ways we cannot yet fully appreciate. Obama is not simply the first nonwhite (that we know of) to occupy the office. He is the first to have lived in the global South, the first to be a direct descendent of colonized people, the first to have a genuine movement background. Consider: How many community meetings, how many movement meetings did Obama attend before entering electoral politics? But he is no more powerful than any of his predecessors; he is constrained as they were by the US system of rule, by the US racial regime, by structural racism. In addition he is constrained by racism as no other US president has ever been. No other president has experienced racism directly: Moreover, while my own upbringing hardly typifies the African American experience – and although, largely through luck and circumstance, I now occupy a position that insulates me from most of the bumps and bruises that the average black man must endure – I can recite the usual litany of petty slights that during my forty-five years have been directed my way: security guards tailing me as I shop in department stores, white couples who toss me their car keys as I stand outside a restaurant waiting for the valet, police cars pulling me over for no apparent reason. I know what it’s like to have people tell me I can’t do something because of my color, and I know the bitter swill of swallowed back anger. I know as well that Michelle and I must be continually vigilant against some of the debilitating story lines that our daughters may absorb – from TV and music and friends and the streets – about who the world thinks they are, and what the world imagines they should be. (Obama, 2006: 233) On the other hand: he has a ‘kill list’. All presidents kill people, but Obama is the first systematically and publicly to take charge of these egregious and unconstitutional uses of exceptional powers. In this he echoes Carl Schmitt, the Nazi political theorist, whose famous dictum is ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (2004 [1922]). The drones, the surveillance, and the numerous right turns of his administration all stand in sharp contradiction not only to his campaign rhetoric, but to the anti-racist legacy of the civil rights movement that arguably put him in office. Obama has not interceded for blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in US history, the ‘great recession’ of 2008. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights – particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of color are concentrated. Obama himself largely deploys colorblind racial ideology, although he occasionally critiques it as well. Beneath this ostensibly postracial view the palpable and quite ubiquitous system of racial distinction and inequality remains entrenched. Though modernized and ‘moderated’, structural racism has been fortified, not undermined, by civil rights reform; Obama is not challenging it, at least not directly. Reframing the Discussion What should we be studying and teaching now? The list of themes I have highlighted here is partial of course, and perhaps impressionistic as well. If the argument I have proposed has any validity, then the ‘dark matter’ of race, which is even more invisible now than it was in the past – in its present ‘post-civil rights’, ‘colorblind’, and even ‘presidential’ forms – continues to exercise its gravitational pull on our politics. It continues to shape what is called (and improperly deprecated as) ‘identity politics’. The ‘dark matter’ takes on new significance as a central feature of neoliberalism, which is enacted today through the deployment of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, ‘states of exception’, state violence, and exclusionary politics – all political practices that rely on racism. Yet the legacy of centuries of resistance to these depredations, the undeniable achievements of anti-racist and ant-imperialist struggles, the extension of democracy – often tortuous and always incomplete

5. Root cause explanations of politics don’t exist- methodological pluralism is key to open up new ideas and avoid violence.

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences.

7. Aff isn’t roleplaying- I’m not pretending that I am the state, I am merely forming an opinion about what the state should do. For example, I can say that criminal ought not murder people without thinking that I am that criminal. Avoids the link and non-unique your offense, everyone forms opinions about the government.

1. Rebar Niemi, “Mr. Nebel’s neighborhood, OR Nebel Tea– I sip it.” September 22, 2015. Premier Debate. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)